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Summary 
In October 2009, the Commission of the European Union published its proposal for a 
regulation dealing with the private international law aspects of succession. Towards the 
end of last year, the UK Government exercised its right not to opt-in to the Regulation at 
that stage. This thesis examines the reasons behind the UK’s decision not to opt-in and 
considers the possible ways in which the UK’s concerns might be addressed during the 
course of the on-going negotiations. In doing this, the thesis will discuss the main points of 
contention in the regulation, which evidence a gulf between the English common law and 
the civil law of continental Europe, and how this might be overcome.  
This thesis attempts to illustrate that the current intransigence of some Member States as 
regards certain aspects of the regulation shows a disregard for the historical evolution of 
the civilian legal tradition in those countries. By emphasising the historical development of 
such civilian concepts as forced heirship and domicile, this thesis suggests that there is 
greater scope for a compromise solution than has been envisaged until now. By a similar 
token, domestic reform within the UK indicates that there is room for manoeuvre within 
the common-law approach to succession. Based on this, the thesis argues for more flexible 
negotiating positions during discussions relating to the Regulation. 
Overall, the conclusion that the thesis draws is that problems relating to claw-back and the 
connecting factor(s), in particular, are not insurmountable. It asserts that a greater 
cognizance of history coupled with an increased awareness of the failings of domestic 
regimes can lead to compromises which would ultimately promote a more acceptable 
regulation to which the UK would feel more comfortable opting-in.        
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Introduction 
The law of succession has a direct impact on the lives of countless individuals. As a branch 
of the law of property, it affects a person’s patrimony in a number of ways. However, it is 
also closely related to family law and as a result is greatly influenced by family 
relationships. In the past, the law of succession has been seen as inextricably linked with 
the culture and society of a given country because of that legal system’s particular 
conception of family relationships and the central importance of the law of property in that 
country. Given this perceived inherent cultural component to the law of succession, it was 
thought that the law of succession was not as well suited to transnational harmonisation 
initiatives as other areas of law might be. 
Whilst this view persists today to a certain extent, the European Union has continually 
affirmed in recent years its desire to harmonise the private international law rules relating 
to succession. The harmonisation of private international law rules in no way implies the 
harmonisation of substantive succession law in the Member States. This is something that 
the European Commission has been quite clear about and does not see as politically 
feasible at this stage. In fact, the desire to harmonise the private international law rules 
relating to succession suggests that a coordinated approach to conflict of laws within the 
Union will help to alleviate the significant problems, which result from the divergent 
substantive law rules relating to succession. Despite this, it is questionable whether 
harmonised private international law rules can succeed in remedying these problems 
without a degree of harmonisation of substantive law rules. 
The European Union, however, is not competent to pass legislation with the aim of 
harmonising substantive succession law. Therefore, its only option in this regard is to deal 
with the private international law rules. Nevertheless, the question remains whether 
political agreement on these rules will be forthcoming given the highly divergent 
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approaches towards succession law in the Member States and the lack of basic agreement 
about certain fundamentals such as what falls within the scope of succession law. 
The European Commission has proposed a Regulation dealing with the private 
international law aspects of transnational succession. This is a holistic instrument covering 
the traditional areas of private international law, namely jurisdiction, applicable law, and 
recognition and enforcement. In addition to this, it also proposes creating a European 
Certificate of Succession that would be directly enforceable in the Member States. This is 
an ambitious and controversial instrument, which has created considerable division within 
the EU. At the time of writing, negotiations are ongoing within the Council and it remains 
to be seen what sort of final instrument will emerge and whether the UK (and Ireland) will 
feel able to opt-in. 
The proposed Succession Regulation raises a number of specific issues, a thorough 
analysis of which would be impractical, given the time and space restraints of this thesis.1 
Instead this thesis will focus on what the present writer considers to be the most pressing 
and controversial issues presented by the Regulation. Chapter one will provide a general 
overview of the main provisions of the Regulation and highlight the key challenges that it 
presents. Chapter two and three will discuss two of the key obstacles that the Regulation 
presents to the UK opting-in, namely the inclusion of claw-back within the scope of the 
applicable law and the designation of the appropriate connecting factor. These chapters 
will situate both of these issues in a comparative and historical context in order to 
understand the strength of feelings that underlie the various negotiating positions and to 
explore to what extent there might be room for manoeuvre. Whilst such an analysis could 
not be comprehensive given the limitations of this thesis, it is illustrative of how the 
common law and civil law came to have such divergent positions on these issues. The 
                                                 
1
 For a detailed account of the issues raised by the regulation see A Dutta, ‘Succession and Wills in the 
Conflict of Laws on the Eve of Europeanisation’ (2009) 73 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und 
internationales Privatrecht 547. 
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conclusion of the thesis will summarise the discussions of the foregoing chapters and 
consider the implications of these discussions for the future of the Regulation and the UK’s 
participation in it. 
Connecting factor and claw-back are not the only controversial issues that the proposed 
Regulation raises. There are various other obstacles to the UK’s participation. Perhaps one 
of the most significant of these is the inclusion within the scope of the Regulation of 
administration of estates. In the UK, and certain other Member States, the actual transfer of 
property on death forms a separate area of law, called administration of estates, and is not 
subject to the law applicable to succession. In many continental systems, there is no 
concept of administration of estates because the property passes directly to the heir upon 
death. This divergence over such a crucial concept as the proper scope of succession law 
would seem to demonstrate a fundamental lack of agreement on the basics, which makes 
the harmonisation of the private international law rules in the area of succession 
problematic. Other issues include the recognition and enforcement of authentic 
instruments, the scope and effect of the Certificate of Succession and the classification 
boundaries with maintenance, matrimonial property and trusts. Whilst these will be 
discussed to some extent in the following chapter, which is a general overview of the 
Regulation, it will not be possible to explore these topics in detail. 
The decision to focus on claw-back and connecting factor was a strategic choice given that 
these are the issues that the UK objects to most strongly and are likely to present the most 
problems in reaching a compromise. The recognition and enforcement of authentic 
instruments, which will not be discussed in detail, is an important issue because the use of 
authentic instruments by notaries is often how estates are wound up on the continent. 
However, recognition and enforcement of these instruments is only likely to be 
problematic in contentious cases, during which they can be challenged before a court in the 
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member state where they were issued. As regards administration of estates, this is also an 
important issue. However, the Regulation does strike a balanced compromise which would 
protect the UK’s procedures for administration of estates and is discussed briefly in the 
next chapter. The European Certificate of Succession would threaten to undermine this if it 
were treated as decisive of a broad range of issues. However, as things stand in the 
Regulation, it would not be treated as such in the UK, given our court-based procedure for 
administration of estates. Therefore, whilst all these issues deserve detailed discussion 
during the negotiations, it is unlikely that they will present significant barriers to the UK 
opting-in, provided that a mutually acceptable interpretation of the Regulation can be 
agreed on.     
In addition to the time and word constraints, this thesis’s analysis of certain aspects of the 
proposed Regulation is limited by the restricted availability of historical and comparative 
materials in the English language. Given that chapters two and three, on claw-back and 
connecting factor respectively, attempt to undertake a historical and comparative analysis, 
the scope and rigour of this study is limited by the present writer’s lack of foreign language 
skills. Therefore, information on foreign legal systems and historical documents, the latter 
of which are often written in Latin, can only be accessed in summary form in English. As a 
result, the comparative aspect of the historical research will be limited to comparisons 
between Scotland, England and France, on which most material is available, with 
occasional reference to other legal systems, such as that of Germany, where appropriate. In 
addition, much of the historical analysis is derived from a comparison of secondary 
sources, where reference to primary material would be impractical.  
Despite these various constraints, this thesis attempts to situate current disagreements over 
certain aspects of the Succession Regulation in their historical context by discussing and 
comparing the development of these concepts in a number of legal systems within the EU. 
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One of the main reasons that this thesis adopts a historical and comparative approach is to 
gain some perspective on Member States’ intransigence over these issues and provide 
some sort of context for assessing the acceptability of any potential compromise solution. 
The thesis pursues this aim within the confines of its remit and should not be seen as a 
comprehensive review of the proposed regulation but rather as focussing on two of the 
thorniest and most divisive issues raised by the proposal. 
The analysis in which this thesis engages reveals that the common element that links both 
the issue of connecting factor and claw-back is that the current doctrinal positions of the 
Member States seem out of line with the historical development of these concepts. As 
regards connecting factor, it is ironic that continental legal systems initially preferred to 
use a more permanent connecting factor such as domicile and then nationality but now 
support a much more transient connecting factor in habitual residence. This stands in 
contrast to the common-law systems, which inherited the concept of domicile from the 
civil law and now stand by, a somewhat modified version of, that connecting factor. Given 
this historical perspective and how habitual residence operates in practice in the countries 
that use it, as discussed in chapter three, perhaps the Member States of the EU could be 
more amenable to the UK’s suggestion of having a more well-defined and less easily 
changeable connecting factor. 
As regards claw-back, the historical considerations discussed in chapter two suggests that 
both the UK and continental legal systems should be open to compromise on this issue. 
This historical analysis undermines continental legal systems’ assertion that claw-back is a 
necessary corollary of forced heirship; it also reveals that some form of claw-back may 
have existed in England at one stage. This analysis is not necessarily decisive because, as 
the chapter points out, different legal systems attach varying degrees importance to the 
family unit. However, it has the potential to encourage a more flexible negotiating position 
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that is more open to compromise solutions. Throughout all these chapters, and especially in 
the following general overview chapter, the thesis attempts to highlight the relevance and 
significance of this historical and comparative analysis to the current discussions on the 
Succession Regulation.     
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1. Overview 
1.1 Background 
The harmonisation of private international law in civil matters within the European Union 
(EU) has a long history dating back to the 1968 Brussels Convention.1 This was adopted at 
a time when the Member States of the EU were empowered to negotiate conventions to 
secure the ‘simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and 
enforcement of judgments’.2 The EU subsequently gained express legislative competence, 
through the Treaty of Amsterdam,3 to adopt ‘measures in the field of judicial cooperation 
in civil matters,’4 which have ‘cross border implications...insofar as necessary for the 
proper functioning of the internal market’.5 This includes measures relating to jurisdiction, 
applicable law, and recognition and enforcement.6 This resulted in the Brussels I 
Regulation7 and the Brussels II Regulation (later supplanted by Brussels II bis),8 both of 
which replaced the Brussels Convention. Subsequently the adoption of private 
international law instruments in the Council, other than those dealing with family law 
matters, was facilitated by the change in voting requirements from unanimity to qualified 
majority voting brought about by the Treaty of Nice.9 More recently, the Treaty of 
                                                 
1
 Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels 
Convention, consolidated version) [1998] OJ C 27/1. 
2
 Treaty establishing the European Community [1992] OJ C224/01, art 220.  
3
 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts (Treaty of Amsterdam) [1997] OJ C 340/1. 
4
 Treaty establishing the European Community (EC Treaty, as amended) [2002] OJ C 325/33 art 61(c). 
5
 EC Treaty (n 4) art 65.  
6
 EC Treaty (n 4) art 65. 
7
 Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I) [2001] OJ L 12/1. 
8
 Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (Brussels II bis) [2003] OJ L 338/1. 
9
 Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts (Treaty of Nice) [2001] OJ C 80/01.  
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Lisbon10 has weakened the internal market requirement for private international law 
instruments, giving the EU broader competence in this area.11   
However, through all of this, wills and succession were excluded from the scope of the 
Convention12 and both Regulations.13 This was because of the ‘fairly marked differences 
between the various States on matters of succession…and the very marked divergences 
between the rules of conflict of laws’.14 The EU has come a long way since the Brussels 
Convention and has repeatedly affirmed the need to harmonise private international law 
rules relating to succession.  
This was recognised as early as the Jenard Report on the Brussels Convention, which 
stated that ‘it was necessary, and would become increasingly so as the EEC developed in 
the future, to facilitate the recognition and enforcement of judgments given in matters 
relating to succession’.15 The EU’s 1998 Vienna Action Plan went even further by setting 
the goal of examining the possibility of drawing up a legal instrument relating to not only 
recognition and enforcement of judgments regarding succession but also jurisdiction and 
applicable law.16 Despite no specific mention of succession in the European Council’s 
1999 Tampere Conclusions,17 the Tampere Programme that shortly followed them 
proposed, for the first time, the concrete goal of creating a legal instrument dealing with 
                                                 
10
 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community [2007] OJ C306/1. 
11
 For a more detailed discussion about the changes brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon in private 
international law see G de Groot and J Kuipers, ‘The New Provisions on Private International Law in the 
Treaty of Lisbon’ (2008) 15(1) Maastricht Journal of International and Comparative Law 109. 
12
 Brussels Convention (n 1) art 1(1). 
13
 Brussels I (n 7) art 1(2)(a); Brussels II bis (n 8) art 1(3)(f) 
14
 P Jenard, ‘Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters signed at Brussels 27 September 1968’ (Jenard Report), [1979] OJ C 59/1, 11.  
15
 P Jenard (n 14) 11. 
16
 Action plan of the Council and the Commission on how best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security and justice [1999] OJ C 19/1, 10. 
17
 Presidency Conclusions, Tampere Council, 15 and 16 October 1999 (Tampere Conclusions) 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00200-r1.en9.htm> accessed 
February 2010.  
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jurisdiction, and recognition and enforcement of judgments in the area of succession.18 
This was supported in the European Council’s 2004 Hague Programme, which called on 
the Commission to present a green paper regarding private international law aspects of 
succession,19 which they duly did in 2005.20        
A consultation process followed the publication of the Green Paper during which the 
Commission received a number of responses. The Commission considered these responses 
and, in October 2009, published a proposal for a regulation relating to private international 
law aspects of succession.21 In December 2009, following a Ministry of Justice (MoJ) 
public consultation,22 Jack Straw, the Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor, 
announced that the UK Government had decided to exercise its right, under the UK and 
Ireland’s Protocol to the Maastricht Treaty,23 not to opt-in to the Succession Regulation. 
He confirmed that the Government still supports the project in principle and intends to 
engage fully in the negotiations with the hope of being able to adopt the final regulation.24 
In the same statement, Mr. Straw emphasised what had already been highlighted by the 
MoJ’s Consultation Document, namely that the major obstacles as far as the UK is 
concerned are claw-back and connecting factor.25 Each of these will be considered in detail 
in their respective chapters later in this thesis. 
                                                 
18
 Council of the European Union, ‘Draft programme of measures for the implementation of the principle of 
mutual recognition of decisions in civil and commercial matters’ (Tampere Programme), [2001] OJ C 12/1, 3 
19
 Council of the European Union, ‘The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in 
the European Union’, [2005] OJ C 53/1, 13. 
20
 Commission of the European Communities, ‘Green Paper on Succession and Wills COM(2005) 65 final 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0065en01.pdf> accessed February 2010.   
21
 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and authentic 
instruments in matters of succession and the creation of a European Certificate of Succession’ COM(2009) 
154 final <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0154:FIN:EN:PDF> accessed 
February  2010.   
22
 Ministry of Justice, ‘European Commission proposal on succession and wills – A public consultation’ 
CP41/09 <http://www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/docs/ec-succession-wills.pdf> accessed September 2010.  
23
 Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland (UK and Ireland Protocol) [1997] C 340/99.  
24
 Hansard HC vol 502 cols 140WS – 141WS (16 December 2009).  
25
 Ministry of Justice, European Commission proposal on succession and wills – A public consultation 
CP41/09 8 – 9 <http://www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/docs/ec-succession-wills.pdf> accessed February 
2010 
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Having outlined the background to the Succession Regulation, the remainder of this 
chapter will be devoted to an examination of the key documents, namely the green paper 
and draft regulation, and the responses these have elicited from the major stakeholders, 
including the report published by the House of Lords EU Select Committee in March 2010.  
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1.2 Green Paper  
The European Commission’s Green Paper on Succession and Wills,26 which was published 
in 2005, raises a number of fundamental questions that need to be answered. Of the various 
issues that the Commission seeks to address, the most controversial seem to be the scope of 
the proposed regulation, the most appropriate connecting factor and the recognition and 
enforcement of non-judicial acts. These points, along with other issues important to the 
UK, are addressed in the UK Government’s response to the Green Paper.27 
As regards the territorial scope of the proposed regulation, the Commission seem to take it 
as read that harmonised conflict rules should operate not only where EU Member States’ 
legal systems are concerned but also in situations involving the legal systems of both 
Member States and non-Member States:  
The universal nature of the future rules should not be in dispute: confining 
the application of the harmonised conflict rules to strictly “intra-
Community” international situations and excluding those in which there is a 
third-country element would make life more difficult for individuals and the 
legal professions.28 
The UK Government, in their response to the Green Paper, make it clear that they do not 
consider this a self-evident truth. In fact, they view this statement as premature, stating that 
‘the question of universal application needs to be addressed properly’.29 There is some 
support for the Commission’s position as it avoids ‘“double-tracked” rules on the conflict 
of laws [which] would lead to difficulties in practice’.30 However, it is questionable 
whether the EU even has competence as regards third countries, or whether this should be 
                                                 
26
 European Commission (n 20). 
27
 Response of the Government of the United Kingdom to the European Commission Green Paper on 
Succession and Wills <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/successions/contributions/ 
contribution_uk_en.pdf> accessed February 2010. 
28
 European Commission (n 20) 4. 
29
 Response of the Government of the United Kingdom to the European Commission Green Paper on 
Succession and Wills, Appendix B, 3 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/successions/ 
contributions/contribution_uk_appb_en.pdf> accessed February 2010. 
30
 P Terner, ‘Perspectives of a European Law of Succession’, [2007] 14 Maastricht Journal of European & 
Comparative Law 147, 163. 
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left to the Member States.31 This concern resonates with the UK Government’s emphasis 
on the importance of treaty base as a matter of legal principle.32 This point does not seem 
to have been taken by the Commission, whose proposal states that ‘any law specified by 
this Regulation shall apply even if it is not the law of a Member State’.33 
Whilst the Commission saw the universal territorial application of the Regulation as 
beyond doubt, it did raise the question of how extensive the substantive scope of the 
Regulation should be:  
What questions should be governed by the law applicable to the succession? 
In particular, should the conflict rules be confined to the determination of 
heirs and their rights or also cover the administration and distribution of the 
estate?34 
This, the UK Government seems to find even more clear-cut than the issue of territorial 
scope. They emphasise that: 
...the administration and distribution of the property of the deceased, should 
fall outside the law of succession...Matters of administration and 
distribution relating to property should...be governed by the law of the 
forum.35 
This view is strongly supported by the Bar Council of England and Wales which 
feels that ‘the applicable law has no role in relation to [administration of estates]’.36 
The Law Society of England and Wales and the Society of Trust and Estate 
Practitioners are less emphatic about excluding administration of estates from the 
scope of the Regulation stating that ‘at the initial stage we should not seek to deal 
with the administrative machinery in place to handle estate administration’. This 
suggests that they may view harmonising the rules relating to administration of 
                                                 
31
 See Response by the Bar Council of England and Wales, 2 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/ 
consulting_public/successions/contributions/contribution_bcew_en.pdf> accessed February 2010;  
32
 UK Government (n 27). 
33
 European Commission (n 21) article 25. 
34
 European Commission (n 20) 5, Question 1.  
35
 UK Government (n 27) 3. 
36
 Bar Council of England and Wales (n 31) 4. 
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estates as a laudable goal but that they would prefer to adopt a more cautious and 
gradual approach to harmonisation at this stage. The view taken by the Swedish 
Government, by contrast, calls for a wide scope of application of the Regulation to 
include the administration and distribution of the estate. In support of this, they 
assert that ‘it would simplify matters greatly if the estate could be administered 
from one country, by one administrator, with one estate inventory and according to 
only one set of rules’.37 In the end, the Commission was persuaded by this view and 
included the administration of estates within the scope of the Draft Regulation, 
subject to the protection of systems that have a separate procedure for 
administration of estates.38 
 
                                                 
37
 Swedish Ministry of Justice, Comments on Commission Green Paper on Succession and Wills 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/successions/contributions/contribution_sweden_e
n.pdf> accessed February 2010. 
38
 See European Commission (n 21) art 21(2). 
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1.3 The Draft Regulation  
This section will consider the key provisions of the draft regulation and how they have 
been received. Firstly, as regards scope, the Commission’s explanatory memorandum, 
which is attached to the proposal, explains its decision to include administration of estates 
in the following terms: 
The concept of “succession” must be interpreted in an autonomous manner 
and encompasses all the elements of a succession, in particular its handover, 
administration and liquidation.39 
This position is contrary to that expressed by the UK Government in its response to the 
Green Paper but follows the suggestions of the Swedish Government.40 This provision is 
particularly problematic for the UK because although it does apply foreign law to the core 
issues governed by succession law such as the determination of heirs etc, it does not apply 
foreign law to the administration of estates as this Regulation would. 
The Regulation is not, however, entirely insensitive to legal systems, such as those of the 
UK, that have a separate, court-based system for the administration of estates. The 
compromise that the Regulation strikes in this regard is not to prevent the operation of a 
separate system of administration of estates where property is located in a country that uses 
such a system.41 However, it is unclear how far this extends. Under the various laws of 
administration of estates in the UK, both inheritance tax and debts owing to creditors 
would be paid before property was transferred to beneficiaries. However, the Regulation 
only expressly provides for tax to be paid before property transfers and not creditors.42 In 
the interests of legal certainty and to avoid any confusion, the present writer submits that 
there should be an express provision stating that creditors can be paid, before property 
                                                 
39
 European Commission (n 21) 4. 
40
 See above n 30 and 31. 
41
 European Commission (n 21) art 21(2)(a). 
42
 European Commission (n 21) art 21(2)(b). 
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transfers to the beneficiaries, in those countries that have a separate system of 
administration of estates. The protection of creditors is one of the key reasons for the UK 
having a separate system of administration of estates. Therefore, it is likely to prove 
unacceptable for the UK to opt-in to a Regulation that undermines this protection.    
Having defined its scope, the Regulation moves on to the rules of jurisdiction. It adopts 
habitual residence as the default connecting factor, which confers general jurisdiction on a 
court. According to the explanatory memorandum, habitual residence was chosen because 
it ‘is the most widespread method used in the Member States…’43 It seems likely that this 
comment pertains to areas other than succession where harmonised European rules impose 
habitual residence as the connecting factor.44 However, as Professor Matthews notes: 
 …all the other contexts in which “habitual residence” is used are directed 
at something to do with the actor, the person concerned, in the short-term, 
but this use of “habitual residence”, although it is describing something 
about the deceased, actually has the effect for the purpose of distributing the 
estate or the succession of deceased, which will affect lots of other people, 
the heirs and the creditors…45 
Therefore, one cannot assume that just because habitual residence is commonly found in 
other contexts, that this connecting factor, especially if left undefined, is appropriate in the 
context of succession.  
                                                 
43
 European Commission (n 21) 5. 
44
 Examples of the use of habitual residence in other contexts include: Brussels II bis (n 8) arts 3 and 8 
(confers jurisdiction in divorce proceedings and those concerning parental responsibility); Regulation (EC) 
No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations (Rome I) [2008] OJ L 177/6 art 4 (determines applicable law governing contracts in 
the absence of choice); Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) [2007] OJ L 199/40 art 4 
(designates the applicable law in certain circumstances governing non-contractual obligations) ;  Council 
Regulation (EC) 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement 
of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations (Maintenance Regulation) [2009] 
OJ L 7/1 art 3 (confers jurisdiction over maintenance claims).  
45
 P Matthews, Minutes of Evidence taken before the Select Committee on the European Union (Sub 
Committee E), 25 November 2009 in European Union Select Committee, ‘The EU’s Regulation on 
Succession: Report with Evidence’ HL (2009-10) 75, 19 (Q13).  
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The problems associated with habitual residence also come into play in the next section of 
the Regulation, which makes habitual residence the default connecting factor for the choice 
of applicable law. By using such a transient connecting factor as habitual residence, which 
could involve a very short period of actual residence, the Regulation raises the problem of 
a person’s personal law changing when they might reasonably expect that it would not. 
This means that as parties move between Member States, the law applicable to the 
succession of their estate could also change with the parties being unaware of this. The 
unintended consequences associated with mutability are somewhat mitigated by the 
Regulation allowing a degree of party autonomy as regards choice of law. However, 
despite this, the Regulation’s restrictive approach to party autonomy does not quite seem to 
strike the correct balance. The problems associated with the connecting factor in relation to 
jurisdiction and applicable law will be discussed more fully in chapter three. 
Another highly contentious aspect of the Regulation is the issue of claw-back. This is a 
practice found in many civil law countries, whereby gifts made during the lifetime of a 
deceased person can be reclaimed back into that person’s estate upon death, in order to 
satisfy the forced heirs’ share of the estate. Although the UK has a similar mechanism for 
the calculation of inheritance tax, this is only a notional device and does not actually 
require gifts to be returned, which could conceivably be the effect of the law in many civil 
law countries. Such a possibility exists in England at the discretion of the court under the 
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975.46 However, it does not seem 
likely that this is often encountered in practice. If such a doctrine were to be imported into 
the domestic laws of the United Kingdom, then it could have potentially far-reaching and 
unsettling consequences on the security of property transfers.  
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Although the Regulation excludes lifetime gifts from its scope,47 it provides that ‘the 
[applicable] law shall govern in particular…any obligation to restore or account for gifts 
and the taking of them into account when determining the shares of heirs’.48 This would be 
a novel development in both Scots and English law and as Lord Bach stated in his evidence 
to the House of Lords EU Select Committee, ‘the introduction of [claw-back] into the UK 
could create major practical difficulties, particularly for the recipients of such gifts, 
including charities.’49 Therefore, it seems highly unlikely that the UK Government would 
be willing to opt-in to this Regulation until some kind of compromise on this issue had 
been reached. The issue of claw-back is discussed in more detail in the following chapter. 
In addition to applicable law and jurisdiction, the Regulation seeks to lay down rules on 
mutual recognition and enforcement. The Regulation stipulates that court decisions should 
be recognised in other Member States without any special procedure and provides a limited 
list of grounds available to refuse recognition of a court decision.50 Whilst this may be 
uncontroversial and in line with other instruments regarding recognition of decisions in 
civil matters, the Regulation goes further and requires the recognition of authentic 
instruments. However, this requirement is not as circumscribed as the automatic 
recognition of court decisions because there is no list of grounds for non-recognition, and 
recognition can be refused only on the grounds of public policy. Despite this, recognition 
of authentic instruments is not a foregone conclusion in the UK.     
As well as dealing with the traditional areas of private international law, the Regulation 
would also create a new legal instrument that is enforceable in any Member State in the 
form of a European Certificate of Succession. This instrument would be an authoritative 
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statement of the entitlement of the heirs and the powers of the executors.51 Such an 
instrument would seem useful for UK executors who sought to have property located in 
other EU Member States transferred to beneficiaries. However, it would have to be made 
clear that this European Certificate of Succession could not be decisive as regards assets in 
the UK as this would undermine the protection of the separate system of administration of 
estates.  
Many of the objections that the UK raises to the proposed Regulation relate to 
classification issues. Whilst a detailed discussion of classification is beyond the scope of 
the thesis, it is worth highlighting, in broad terms, some of the key elements of this issue. 
The UK seeks to interpret succession narrowly, limiting it to the determination of heirs and 
their entitlement upon the death of the deceased. The UK government, unlike many 
continental governments, does not see this as extending to the recovery of lifetime gifts, 
which will be discussed in more detail in chapter two, nor to the actual administration of 
the estate. As regards the latter, many civil-law systems do not have a separate mechanism 
for the administration of the estate, leaving it to the heir to deal with the debts, etc; in the 
UK, and some other Member States, there is a court-based system of winding up the estate. 
This is designed to protect creditors and provide a public record of the succession 
proceedings. 
Given the strongly diverging approaches on this issue, perhaps the compromise proposed 
by the Max Planck Institute52 would be a workable solution. They proposed that 
administration of estates is included within the scope of applicable law unless the law of 
the location of the assets lays down special rules, in which case they would govern the 
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winding up of the estate. This has the advantage that it would not require separate laws to 
govern the administration of estates between those Member States which do not lay down a 
special procedure but would appease those such as Austria and the UK, which does. This 
differs slightly from the rules proposed in the Regulation by explicitly stating that rights in 
rem cannot be exercised in a Member State where the property is located contrary to the 
law of that country. 
Another issue relating to classification is the division between maintenance and succession. 
There is a distinction to be made between the legal rights of forced heirs, which exists in 
civil-law systems, on the one hand, and the discretionary provision for dependants upon 
death, which exists in England and Wales, on the other. The former properly belongs to the 
law of succession, whereas the latter is closer in nature to a maintenance claim. On this 
reading, therefore, there is no contradiction between the UK's opposition to the inclusion of 
claw-back within the scope of the applicable law and the English courts' discretionary 
power to reclaim certain lifetime gifts upon death.53 The latter only applies to those 
dependants who are in financial need and can, thus, properly be said to constitute a 
maintenance claim. Therefore, this can be distinguished from the continental form of claw-
back, which is designed to satisfy forced heirship claims regardless of financial need.  
Whilst this may not be how domestic claims under the 1975 Act are viewed by the English 
courts or the UK Government, it may well be advantageous for them to be considered as 
such in the international context. Given that the UK does not consider claw-back to form 
part of the law of succession, it is highly unlikely that the UK would opt-in to a regulation 
that made claw-back subject to the applicable law. Therefore, if decisions under the 1975 
Act were classed as a form of claw-back, they would not be covered by the mutual 
recognition provisions of any Succession Regulation to which the UK would opt-in. This 
means that a situation could occur whereby an English domiciled dependant spouse 
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receives an award from an English court for the value of a gift made by her spouse a 
number of years before his death to his mistress. However, both her deceased spouse and 
his mistress were habitually resident in Cyprus, which does not allow any form of claw-
back. Therefore, assuming claw-back does not fall within the scope of the Regulation, this 
decision would be unenforceable under the Succession Regulation. This would be the 
situation at present without the Succession Regulation being in force.  
By contrast, if such an award were classified as a maintenance decision, this could be 
enforced under the Maintenance Regulation. The relationship between succession and 
maintenance claims is not explicitly addressed in the Maintenance Regulation, which 
simply provides that '[t]his Regulation shall apply to maintenance obligations arising from 
a family relationship, parentage, marriage or affinity'.54 Classifying the 1975 Act claims as 
maintenance would not only be relevant for the reduction of lifetime gifts, which probably 
has limited practical relevance in any event. It would also be advantageous for 
redistribution of the estate and the setting aside of testamentary bequests in response to 
claims from individuals who would not be forced heirs under the applicable law but were, 
nonetheless dependant on the deceased. This could occur in situations where the Act 
covers a broader range of people, such as former spouses, than the forced heirship 
provisions of the applicable law. In such a situation the estate would have to be distributed 
in accordance with the applicable law. Therefore, it would not be open to the English court 
to alter this in favour of a dependant non-forced heir, if the powers under the 1975 Act 
were classed as succession. However, arguably, if these powers were classed as 
maintenance, then the English courts could make an order that the maintenance claim be 
satisfied out of the estate, which would have to be recognised under the Maintenance 
Regulation. This, however, raises the question of which Regulation would take precedence 
in the event of a conflict, which should be resolved in the interests of legal certainty. 
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1.4 Domestic Response 
Based on the foregoing section, it seems clear, therefore, that the Commission’s Proposal 
contains several issues that are highly contentious within the UK. The following section 
will discuss the reaction to these provisions from various interested parties in the United 
Kingdom. There has been widespread consultation on the Commission’s Green Paper, a 
Ministry of Justice Consultation and extensive hearings by the House of Lords to gather 
evidence from expert witnesses on the Draft Succession Regulation. One of the 
overarching concerns that runs through the majority of the responses from interested 
parties in the UK is the expansive scope of the proposed regulation.  
Scope can be understood in two ways. Firstly, there is the extent of private international 
law matters that are covered by the Regulation. Whilst this does not evoke quite such 
strong opinion as the other meaning of scope, there is still some disagreement over the 
utility of addressing all aspects of private international law. Some, such as the European 
Parliament, feel that the Regulation should adopt a holistic approach to private 
international law and lay down harmonised rules for applicable law, jurisdiction, and 
recognition and enforcement.55 Others, such as Shepherd and Wedderburn,56 implicitly 
accept this by arguing for there to be equivalence between the connecting factors that 
determine jurisdiction and those that determine applicable law. Despite this, there are 
those, such as Carruthers and Crawford, who argue that harmonising the rules of 
jurisdiction is unnecessary, whilst still supporting the harmonisation of applicable law.57   
There seems to be a growing feeling that a piecemeal approach to private international law 
is inadequate in meeting the aim of legal certainty. In the past, instruments that have 
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focussed solely on applicable law have not been widely ratified.58 Recently, the EU 
Maintenance Regulation adopted a more holistic approach dealing with jurisdiction, 
applicable law and recognition and enforcement in a single instrument.59 Whilst some, 
such as Carruthers and Crawford,60 would argue an exemption for the field of succession, it 
does not seem that this case has been made out. Rather than question the inclusion of rules 
of jurisdiction at all, one might argue that these rules have not been extended far enough. 
Given that the majority of succession cases are non-contentious, and therefore dealt with 
largely by notaries in continental Europe, it seems inconsistent with the reality of the 
situation not to extend jurisdictional rules to non-judicial bodies such as notaries. The 
likelihood of this featuring in the Regulation is, however, slim given the political 
opposition from countries such as France.  
A more evocative issue than this is the area of substantive law that the Regulation 
designates as being governed by the applicable law. This debate centres on the definition 
of succession, which is a contentious issue. The regulation itself takes an all-inclusive 
approach to the definition of succession including all issues relating to the succession from 
start to finish. This is supported by the European Parliament61 and Sweden,62 amongst 
others. However, as the chairman of the law and institutions sub-committee of the House 
of Lords EU Select Committee notes,63 it is likely to be a major stumbling block to the 
UK's participation in the Regulation. The first point of contention is the potential for the 
Regulation to unsettle lifetime property transfers. This is a possibility unknown in Scotland 
and very rare in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and has the potential to affect the 
stability of land registers as well as trust law. There seems to be a consensus that the core 
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of succession law is to determine who is entitled to inherit. Beyond that perhaps, as 
Professor Harris argues in his HOLEUSC evidence,64 there should be a distinction drawn, 
as with the Hague succession and trust conventions, between what is agreed to form part of 
succession law on the one hand and ancillary matters on the other. The same would apply 
to the Regulation's inclusion of administration of estates within its scope, which the UK 
argues should properly be subject to the lex situs.  
Be that as it may, allowing the applicable law to govern the transfer of immoveable 
property located in another member state is not unknown in the UK, as Professor Harris 
argues: 
we do already have, of course, the Hague Trusts Convention and the 
Recognition of Trusts Act 1987 in the UK. That applies equally to trusts of 
land and allows the settlor to choose the governing law applicable to a trust 
of land, including any powers that they may have to terminate the trust and 
claim the property. That radical departure from the law of the situs does not 
appear to have caused practical problems. It is already a major inroad into 
the law of the situs...65 
This may, however, not be so straightforward in the succession context given the balancing 
of interests between creditors and heirs discussed earlier.66 
As Professor Harris notes, the two concerns regarding substantive scope and coverage of 
private international law issues are not unrelated. In fact, if the latter were resolved so that 
the scope of the Regulation excluded anything other than what constitutes the common 
core of succession, then the coverage of private international law issues would be less of an 
issue. In other words, courts would be less reticent to apply foreign law if they knew that it 
did not affect ancillary matters as the Regulation currently purports to do:  
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If one can get a very tightly construed regulation that really answers the 
bald question of who is the heir according to the governing law, is it X or Y, 
I think I would be less concerned about the range of the regulation in terms 
of the private international law issues it might cover.67  
As regards the scope of the proposed regulation, the House of Lords EU Select Committee 
advocates a cautious approach stating that: 
Limiting the scope of the proposal to determining the law applicable to the 
issue of who is entitled to what asset in any particular succession would 
result in simpler legislation...It would also permit the continuation of 
important UK procedures for administering successions...68 
Based on Professor Harris’s evidence to the Select Committee inquiry, the fact that the 
House of Lords would limit the substantive reach of the Regulation suggests that its private 
international law scope could remain broad. However, consistent with their cautious 
approach, the Committee state that:  
this is an area for a step by step approach to legislation. However it would 
have been preferable for the first proposal in this field to have focussed on 
the issue of the law that should apply to a cross-border succession (the 
applicable law).69 
This conclusion resonates well with those who felt that jurisdictional rules were difficult to 
operate in practice70 but does not goes as far as those who felt there was no need for such 
rules.71 
The final issue that many found objectionable is the rules on recognition and enforcement, 
particularly as they relate to authentic instruments and the European Certificate of 
Succession. There seems to be little objection to the recognition of court decisions, as is 
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standard practise in other areas, other than that it may raise certain practical difficulties.72 
However, there is widespread opposition to the suggestion that authentic instruments, 
drawn up by notaries, should be recognised and enforced.73 In Professor Matthews’s view, 
given the lack of procedural safeguards that exists in notarial proceedings as opposed to 
court proceedings, authentic instruments should merely be a piece of evidence that a court 
considers.74 Despite assurances by the Director-General, DG Justice, Freedom and Security 
of the European Commission that there were sufficient safeguards in place and that 
notaries were indispensable in overseeing successions in many Member States.75 The 
House of Lords EU Select Committee concluded that: 
We consider that the mutual recognition and enforcement of court decisions 
is likely to be sufficiently non-controversial to be acceptable in principle. 
However we do not consider that there is sufficient mutual trust at present 
to justify making authentic instruments recognisable and enforceable.76 
As regards the European Certificate of Succession, there seems to be a degree of 
uncertainty and differing views over the actual effect of such as certificate, as summarised 
in the EU Select Committee Report.77 However, there seemed to be a general consensus 
that the Certificate should not be conclusive, but should rather have evidentiary value, and 
that it should not be able to bypass domestic procedure for the administration of estates. 
This prompted the House of Lords Select Committee to conclude that: 
We do not support an ECS which overrides national law and practice as a 
consequence of being automatically recognised in every Member State and 
treated as conclusive of the matters stated in it. We can, however, see 
advantages in an ECS which facilitates the operation of national procedures 
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by providing non-conclusive evidence of the salient aspects of a 
succession.78 
Overall, therefore, the Commission’s Proposal for a Succession Regulation contains 
several aspects that are difficult for the UK to support. Despite this, certain aspects of the 
Regulation that might have been thought to prove controversial have been accepted 
without question. The abandonment of scission, for example, is a considerable step 
forward. Whilst the UK currently adopts a scission-based system, there has been recent 
suggestion that this should be reformed at the domestic level.79 Therefore, it is not proving 
to be an obstacle during negotiations on the Regulation with the Justice and Home Affairs 
Council accepting the abolition of scission as a political goal earlier this year.80  
There has been wide-ranging consultation by both the Government and the House of Lords 
in an attempt to identify potential problems and seek potential solutions. Given the 
potentially disruptive effect this Regulation could have in the UK, the Government was 
justified not to opt-in at this stage. At the moment, the potential drawbacks of the 
Regulation seem to outweigh the benefits. However, it is encouraging that the UK 
Government is still committed to seeking compromise solutions in the negotiations 
because the Regulation could have significantly beneficial effects in the UK. Hopefully, 
therefore, a solution can be found during the negotiations that is acceptable to all Member 
States. The remainder of this thesis will be devoted to analysing the key points of 
contention of the Regulation from a historical and comparative perspective in an attempt to 
challenge Member States’ current negotiating positions and to encourage them to 
reconsider their dogmatic stances on the issues.   
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2. Claw – back 
2.1 Introduction 
Claw-back exists alongside forced heirship provisions in many continental European 
Member States. It allows an heir to reclaim, or reclaim the value of, gifts made during the 
deceased’s lifetime, in order to satisfy his or her compulsory share of the deceased’s 
property on death. Claw-back is seen as inextricably linked to the protection of forced heirs 
from disinheritance: 
Clawback is part and parcel of the protection of close family members by 
forced heirship; the deceased shall not be able to devaluate the rights of his 
family members by diminishing his estate before his death.1 
However, this has not always been the case. Roman law recognised a compulsory portion 
of the estate to be divided amongst forced heirs upon the deceased’s death but did not 
restrict an individual’s ability to dispose of his or her property whilst alive.2 Therefore, 
whilst the forced heirship provisions of civil-law  Member States may have been derived 
from and reinforced by the reception of Roman law, claw-back was not. 
In contrast to civil-law systems, the common-law Member States recognise neither the 
notion of claw-back, as it is known in the civil law, nor the concept of forced heirship.3 
This dichotomy between common law and civil law can be explained on the basis of the 
historical development of property law and ownership in these countries coupled with the 
evolution of the place of the family unit in society. Interestingly, Scotland, a mixed legal 
system, recognises forced heirship but not claw-back. As will be discussed below, this 
seems to be on account of pre-existing conceptions of forced heirship being reinforced by 
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the reception of Roman Law in Scotland and restrictions on the freedom of alienation that 
once existed in Scotland being extinguished through the influence of the English common 
law.   
Claw-back, therefore, has not always been present in civilian legal systems, nor have 
family restraints on the freedom of alienation of property always been absent from the 
common law. Despite this, claw-back, or the lack thereof, seems now to be deeply rooted 
in the society, history and culture of a given Member State. This would appear to be a 
manifestation of the large cultural component of succession law that comparative lawyers 
refer to.4 Given the inherent link between succession law in general, in particular claw-
back, and a society’s values, it would be extremely difficult for a legal system to suddenly 
recognise a power of claw-back, as the Regulation would require the UK to do. It would be 
similarly difficult for continental legal systems to risk excluding claw-back from the 
proposed Regulation even just for the common-law countries, as the UK would have it, 
because of the fear that this loophole might be exploited to exclude the protection from 
disinheritance that these legal systems afford forced heirs. The degree to which succession 
law is embedded in a society’s culture, however, does not necessitate the conclusion that 
no transnational solution can be found. 
The issue of claw-back in relation to the Succession Regulation is a particularly divisive 
one because it is a concept that is virtually unknown in the common-law world but is 
present, in one form or another, in the majority of civil-law countries. The extent of the 
power of claw-back that exists, including how far back gifts can be reclaimed, whom they 
can be reclaimed from and what the property implications of this are, varies from one 
Member State to another. However, it is a commonly held view that some form of claw-
back of inter vivos gifts is a necessary corollary of forced heirship provisions and is 
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required in order to render these provisions in any way meaningful.5 The implication of 
this argument is that without claw-back provisions, the forced heirship rights could easily 
be defeated by disposing of assets by way of lifetime gifts.  
At this stage it is tempting to raise the question of how seriously society should take forced 
heirship provisions for non-dependent adult offspring. However, this discussion is beyond 
the scope of the current thesis. Although the whole concept of forced heirship is unknown 
to the law of England and Wales and Northern Ireland, it is not the role of private 
international law to question the desirability or suitability of foreign substantive law. 
Despite this, a Member State can quite legitimately question the application of a rule of 
foreign substantive law, which is manifestly contrary to the public policy of that state. The 
UK Government does not seek to challenge the application of forced heirship provisions 
over property situated in the United Kingdom even though this runs contrary to the guiding 
principle of English succession law namely freedom of testation.6 This is partly because 
this concept is already recognised in Scotland and partly because it does not have a knock 
on effect in other areas of law but is rather confined to the division of assets upon death. 
Claw-back, on the other hand, could have considerable implications beyond the law of 
succession. The recognition of foreign claw-back provisions in the United Kingdom could 
have the effect of disrupting the security of lifetime transfers, which would have an 
unsettling effect on the land registries and have a fundamentally detrimental impact on the 
system of property transfer in the United Kingdom.7 On this basis, it seems justified that 
the UK Government objects, on public policy grounds, to the inclusion of claw-back 
within the scope of the law applicable to succession. 
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This chapter aims to explore the divergence in the way claw-back operates between the 
various Member States in order to illustrate how indeterminate and potentially far-reaching 
a legal device it is. The chapter will then attempt to situate claw-back in its historical 
context in an effort to illustrate that forced heirship and claw-back are not as intrinsically 
linked in their development as is commonly believed. The intention of this historical 
analysis is to encourage Member States to question their dogmatic negotiating positions so 
that they might be open to compromise solutions. Finally, the chapter will explore potential 
options for overcoming disagreements surrounding claw-back in the search for a mutually 
acceptable outcome in the final regulation.     
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2.2 Overview 
This section will draw heavily on a recent comparative study of claw-back provisions 
conducted, on behalf of the UK Ministry of Justice, by Professor Paisley at the University 
of Aberdeen. It will also make considerable use of a recently published book called 
International Succession by Louis Garb and John Wood,8 which provides an up-to-date 
overview of the succession rules of numerous countries including a number of Member 
States. These comparative works provide an invaluable backdrop for analysing such 
transnational initiatives as the Succession Regulation because of the relative dearth of 
material in the English language on the domestic laws of other Member States in this area. 
As Professor Paisley notes: 
The various provisions of the Civil Codes and relative laws of succession 
that contain “clawback” are difficult to find in good English translations in 
the UK or on the web even for enthusiastic academics…In the present state 
of affairs there would be little information available for practitioners who 
would wish to give advice within the United Kingdom at the time of the 
making of an inter vivos gift.9 
To an extent, this is a complication associated with the application of any foreign law and 
is not peculiar to claw-back. This is an argument that many common-law lawyers, with 
their inherent preference for lex fori, might use to avoid the application of foreign law 
altogether.10 However, as Professor Paisley illustrates the “barrier of language” is not in 
itself an insurmountable problem because governments could pay for official translations 
of their laws. This is probably something to be encouraged in various contexts, not only 
succession, and there are initiatives to facilitate the access to foreign law. Although the 
issue of access to and the application of foreign law per se is beyond the scope of this 
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thesis, the reason for discussing this issue in the present context is to highlight the 
particular difficulties associated with ascertaining the precise nature of claw-back, given 
the divergent practices in the various Member States. 
 Based on Professor Paisley’s study, there seems to be a number of variants on the extent 
of the claw-back provisions. In addition to this, there are certain crucial questions about the 
relationship between claw-back and other areas of property law that seem not to have been 
addressed in systems where claw-back operates. As Professor Paisley notes, this makes it 
very difficult to know exactly what the UK would be opting-in to and the practical effects 
of allowing claw-back to operate in the UK.11 It may be that the reason these questions 
remain unanswered in the domestic legal systems of the Member States is that they are 
very rarely invoked in practice, which suggests that the inclusion of these provisions 
should not be such an important issue. 
The first issue that there is a lack of agreement about on the continent is the effect of claw-
back on gifts made by the deceased during his or her lifetime. Some Member States, such 
as Belgium,12 Malta,13 Portugal14 and Spain15 provide for the actual recovery of the gifted 
asset. Conversely, other Member States, such as The Netherlands16, only afford the heir a 
personal claim for recovery of the value of the gift (or a portion thereof). This is the case in 
Poland17 and France18 too. However, Polish law19 and, since 2006, French law20 expressly 
grant the possibility for the donee to return the gift rather than pay its value. Other Member 
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States, such as Germany,21 Greece22 and Italy23 strike a similar balance by allowing the 
donee to opt for paying back the value of the gift rather than returning it.      
In addition to variations in the extent of the right of recovery created by the claw-back 
provisions, there is a high degree of divergence over how far back the provisions apply. 
There is huge diversity between Member States, some of whom lay down quite restrained 
and restrictive time periods, whereas others set out a disproportionately long time period or 
have no restrictions on how far back a claim for recovery can go. In Belgium,24 for 
example, an heir seems to be able to seek recovery of a gift regardless of how long ago it 
was made. The action for recovery can also be raised at anytime provided it is within the 
thirty-year period of negative prescription. This is similar to the position that existed in 
France until 2006. However, since then an action for recovery prescribes after five years.25 
Both Germany26 and Greece27 limit the applicability of claw-back to gifts made up to ten 
years prior to the deceased’s death and subject the action for recovery to a stricter time 
limit. In the case of Germany, this is 3 years after the heir becomes aware of the donation 
(up to a maximum of 30 years). In Greece, as in Portugal,28 there is a more straightforward 
cut-off point of two years after death. The law of the Netherlands29 goes even further still 
and limits the effect of claw-back to gifts made up to five years prior to death with the right 
of action expiring five years after death. Of all the systems studied by Professor Paisley, 
Austria30 seems to have the most restrained approach to the temporal reach of claw-back 
because it only allows gifts made up to two years prior to death to be challenged. 
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Admittedly, however, Austrian law does not specify a time limit after which the right to 
recover expires.    
A further issue relates to whom the gift can be recovered from. Some Member States only 
allow the heir to pursue an action against the original donee or his heirs. This is the case 
under German,31 Austrian,32 Greek33 and probably Portuguese law.34 By contrast, under 
Belgian law,35 if an heir’s forced heirship claim cannot be satisfied by the original donee, 
the heir can raise an action for recovery against a third party acquirer. A similar situation 
exists in Italy,36 Malta37 and Spain38.  
There is also disagreement as to which lifetime gifts are subject to the possibility of claw-
back. In some systems, such as Belgium,39 France,40 Spain41 and Malta,42 all lifetime gifts 
are subject to claw-back. In other systems, such as the Netherlands,43 Germany,44 Austria45 
and Greece,46 the situation is more complex with certain vague exclusions such as 
customary gifts that are not excessive, gifts in discharge of a moral debt or by reasons of 
decency. Some systems, such as Poland47 and Portugal,48 do, however, provide a 
circumscribed list of gifts that are to be left out of account, for example gifts made when 
the deceased had no children, gifts to the deceased’s spouse prior to marriage or gifts for 
children’s maintenance and education.        
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The implications of accepting claw-back provisions differ depending on how extensive 
they are and the strength of the UK’s opposition to them may similarly vary on that basis. 
The UK is likely to oppose strongly the possibility of being required to recognise such 
extensive claw-back provisions as those found in the Belgian Civil Code. This provides 
that all lifetime gifts, with the exception of life assurance policies, which benefit the 
beneficiaries, can be physically recovered from the original donee and third parties who 
subsequently acquired the gift. The recognition of such an all-encompassing and wide-
ranging form of claw-back could have a markedly detrimental impact on the security of 
property transfers in the UK and would, therefore, be difficult to accept.  
This stands in stark contrast to the well-balanced approach to claw-back that The 
Netherlands have adopted. Dutch law recognises that the value of certain gifts, particularly 
those that are expressly made knowing that it would reduce the assets available to satisfy a 
forced heirship claim, can be recovered from the original donee, provided that an action is 
raised within five years of the death of the deceased.49 Such a formulation is similar, in 
essence, to the power that the courts in England and Wales possess. 
Although English law seeks to protect the freedom of testation of the deceased, and 
therefore contains no forced heirship provisions, it does grant the court a statutory power to 
make discretionary awards to certain family members from the estate of the deceased, if 
the deceased died domiciled in England and Wales.50 Moreover, the court also has the 
power to order the recipient of a gift, made up to six years prior to death, to pay a sum of 
money or other property to the deceased’s family, up to the value of the gift.51 This diluted 
English form of claw-back differs from the continental doctrine in several ways. Firstly, it 
is a discretionary power that the court possesses in order to prevent the surviving family 
members from facing financial hardship. In this way, it could be understood as a form of 
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maintenance rather than a succession right. In addition to this, the intention of the deceased 
in making the gift, as well as a number of other factors such as the donee’s financial 
situation and his or her relationship with the deceased, are taken into account. It is a 
prerequisite for granting an order for payment that the court is satisfied that the deceased’s 
intention in making the gift was to defeat the requirement for reasonable financial 
provision for these family members.52 Therefore, the nature of this power is very different 
from the way claw-back operates on the continent. In practice, these types of claims are 
very rare and English lawyers know how to deal with them.53 The recognition of 
Continental claw-back, however, would represent a significant upheaval to the security of 
property transfer in the UK.54         
Given the lack of commonality in the claw-back provisions of the Member States, it might 
be more appropriate to consider each system separately rather than to reject them all 
wholesale on the basis of a doctrinal opposition to claw-back. In this way, perhaps the EU 
can find a middle ground between the UK’s outright rejection of any claw-back and the 
civil law countries’ insistence on including claw-back within the scope of the applicable 
law. On this basis, it may be possible for the UK to accept a limited form of claw-back, 
such as that in the Netherlands, which extends back a limited number of years. This 
observation relates more to domestic law reform in these countries55 than it does to a 
transnational private international law instrument. The problems associated with trying to 
achieve this in such an  instrument are discussed further below.56 
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2.3 Historical Perspective 
2.2.1 Overview 
The origins of claw-back lie in the historical development of property ownership in Europe 
from Roman law through feudalism to modern-day rules and civil codes. It seems that the 
notion of claw-back was not entirely foreign to Roman law. However it appears to have 
existed in a form closer to that found in England than the more extensive continental 
version of claw-back. In order to appreciate the significance of this, it is necessary briefly 
to outline the development of the law of succession in Roman law.57 The law of the 
Twelve Tables confers an absolute power on the testator to dispose of his property freely.58 
There is, however, some suggestion that this was not always the case. 
On the face of it, this unfettered freedom of testation would seem to place more importance 
on individual freedom than on the ‘natural claims of consanguinity’.59 However, 
consideration of the societal context in which this rule operates reveals that this is not 
necessarily the case. The ancient Roman law adhered to the principle of universal 
succession whereby the heir stood in the shoes of the deceased and assumed his rights and 
duties in relation to the family. This seems to have been predicated on a view of society, 
common to many of the early groups of people and discussed elsewhere in relation to 
Germanic tribes,60 namely that the basic unit within the society is the family rather than the 
individual. On this interpretation the individual merely acts as the representative of the 
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family and the custodian of family property. There appears to be some suggestion that this 
was the situation in ancient Rome.61 
On that basis, the law of the Twelve Tables can be interpreted very differently. Rather than 
bestowing the freedom to alienate property outwith the family, it indicates that: 
What passed from the Testator to the Heir was the Family, that is, the 
aggregate of rights and duties contained in the Patria Potestas and growing 
out of it…The original Will or Testament was therefore an instrument…by 
which the devolution of the Family was regulated.62 
Therefore, the testament, when it was originally instituted under Roman Law, was not 
conceived of as an instrument to deprive a deceased’s family of his estate upon death but 
rather as an instrument stipulating how the estate would be divided within the family. On 
that reading of the law of the Twelve Tables, restrictions on the freedom of testation were 
not necessary because it was not envisaged that a testator would seek to alienate property 
outside of the family: 
In view of the nature of the Roman social organisation at that time, it seems 
quite as reasonable to suppose that the compilers of the Twelve Tables had 
simply never contemplated the possibility of a testator overlooking his 
natural heirs, as to believe that they specially intended to give him the 
power to do this.63  
In any event, the Roman will evidently evolved as a means whereby a testator sought to 
disinherit members of his family because it subsequently became necessary to adopt a 
specific remedy to redress this. 
The Querela Inofficiosi Testamenti was a means by which provisions in a will which 
purported to disinherit unjustly those who would succeed on intestacy could be set aside.64 
It is this restriction on the freedom of testation that led to the creation of the legitimate 
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portion, whereby children of the deceased were entitled to a certain share of the deceased’s 
estate notwithstanding the testator’s wishes. This legitimate portion, as modified by 
Justinian, forms the basis of the forced heirship provisions in civil-law systems and legitim 
in Scotland.65 The Querela, therefore, seems intended to set aside provisions in a will and 
mortis causa gifts but would not generally effect inter vivos gifts.66 Consequently, this 
distinguishes the Querela from the power of claw-back as it exists, for example, in France 
and other continental legal systems because not only legacies under the will and mortis 
causa gifts can be set aside under these systems but inter vivos gifts can also be reclaimed. 
This would seem to belie the suggestion that claw-back is an intrinsic aspect of the 
protection of forced heirship provisions.  
Despite this, it is interesting to note that at some stage, Roman law did recognise a form of 
claw-back, namely when the gift was immoderate or excessive and was intended to defeat 
the claims of forced heirs. However, in Justinian’s time, this seems to have been limited to 
gifts made to issue.67 This sometime existence of a limited form of claw-back 
notwithstanding, the civil-law systems of continental Europe inherited the concept of 
forced heirship or legitimate portion from Roman law and the device that the latter chose 
to protect forced heirs from being disinherited was not extended to include the general 
power to recover inter vivos gifts. This suggests that factors others than the law as it 
existed in the Roman Empire influenced the reception of this aspect of Roman law in 
continental Europe and resulted in a more extensive power of claw-back. 
Claw-back seems to have its origins in the restrictions on alienation of land that existed in 
the Teutonic communities of pre-feudal Europe. On the continent, this was modified most 
markedly by the reception of Roman law, whereas in England it was the development of 
feudalism that had the most profound impact on these early practises. Although feudalism 
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took hold all over Europe, feudalism in England seems to have been particularly strong and 
to have taken a divergent course compared to the rest of Europe.  
The availability of historical material on European legal systems in the English language is 
extremely limited. Therefore, this chapter is largely based on Scottish and English legal 
historians, who nevertheless often adopt a comparative approach in their research, with the 
occasional reference to what little texts there are in English on the history of European 
legal systems, particularly that of France. Some of the earliest treatises on English law 
include Glanville,68 Bracton69 and Littleton.70 Although these books were written in Latin, 
the English translations have proved invaluable sources of information on early English 
laws. These can be supplemented with later writers such as Coke71 and Blackstone72 as 
well as modern legal historians such as Pollock and Maitland.73 As regards Scottish legal 
history, some of the earliest sources include the Regiam Majestatem,74 which seems to 
follow Glanville closely, and Craig’s Jus Feudale.75  
The law of succession forms part of the law of property. However, it is heavily influenced 
by family relationships resulting from family law. Therefore, it is through the law of 
succession that family relationships may affect the law of property. Whether claw-back 
forms part of the law of succession or the law of property more broadly, is a matter of 
classification and is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, this question 
notwithstanding, in the majority of Member States, family relationships can have an impact 
upon lifetime transfers of property as well as the property remaining in a deceased's estate 
after death. This may seem anathema to common-law lawyers nowadays, given the 
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freedom to alienate property and the freedom of testation that English law affords. This, 
however, was not always the case. In the past, English law allowed family relationships to 
have a more marked impact on the lifetime transfer of property than the laws of civil-law 
Member States do now. Similarly, claw-back has not always been seen as intrinsically 
linked to the protection of forced heirs. In fact, the two legal concepts have very different 
histories. 
The nature of this dichotomy between common-law and civil-law systems relates to the 
different ways each system views property law and family law, which is informed by the 
divergent paths the historical evolution of these branches of law took in continental 
Europe, on the one hand, and England, on the other. In Germany and France, for example, 
the family unit, as a legal concept, plays an important role. In the civil codes of both of 
these countries, the notion of family as a group of people has a particular significance in 
the area of family law. In Germany, for example, there is an express maintenance 
obligation towards the family as a whole.76
 
This stands in contrast to English legislation 
governing maintenance, which speaks of separate spousal and child maintenance claims.77 
Family solidarity in France seems even stronger with spouses being responsible for the 
'material and moral guidance of the family,’78 and children owing 'maintenance to their 
father and mother or other ascendants who are in need'.79 
However, the impact of this conception of the family as a unit extends beyond family law 
and affects other areas such as the law of property. In Germany, for example, under the law 
relating to leases, a lessee may object to the termination of a lease and demand its 
continuation if, inter alia, the termination of the lease would be a hardship for him or his 
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family which 'is not justifiable even considering the justified interests of the lessor'.80 This 
is unknown in England where landlords have the right to terminate a tenancy provided that 
sufficient notice is given.81 In France, a person who has the right to enjoy the fruits of a 
tenement (i.e. usufruct, a concept unknown to the common-law) may demand that both his 
needs and the needs of his family are satisfied.82
 
As one commentator on French law puts 
it:  
Even if the family is not in itself a legal concept, the law that governs its 
members treats the family as a coherent community, highly articulated in 
terms of public policy (regles d'ordre public) and in terms of the 
fundamental principles that govern both the persons who are connected by a 
family bond and their property.83 
It is this perceived link between a person's family ties and his property that seems to 
underpin France and Germany’s approach to succession in general and claw-back in 
particular.  
In order to be able to understand and explain the opposing approach of the civil and 
common law to this issue, it is necessary to explore its historical origins. Just as a Member 
States’ modern-day rules of succession are best understood in light of the importance that 
state attaches to the family unit, the origin of these rules is intrinsically linked with the 
historical development of the law of property in that state. Property law in Europe has a 
common heritage dating back to broadly similar customary laws in the various parts of 
Europe through to the rise of feudal law. As one commentator puts it:  
There was nothing extraordinary about Anglo-Saxon customary law; it was 
not particularly different from the customs of the Franks or, indeed, the 
Saxons in north Germany ... Feudal law, when established in England by the 
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Normans, was not very different from feudal law in northern France but it 
developed in a different way.84  
Therefore, an understanding of the current divergence over the issue of claw-back lies in 
the evolution of that concept, in English law and continental legal systems, from the 
common feudal heritage of medieval times, through the reception of Roman law to the 
beginning of modernity in Europe.  
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2.3.2 Historical notions of the nature of ownership 
A discussion of the development of the concept of ownership and the evolution of claw-
back in France reveals the interaction of the various forces that influenced the development 
of this branch of the law and resulted in the entrenchment of claw-back within the French 
legal system.85 This can be contrasted with contemporaneous developments in England, 
which had the opposite effect. Due to time restraints and the restricted availability of 
resources, the following historical analysis will be confined to these two legal systems with 
occasional reference to German law. This, therefore, cannot be generalised to the entirety 
of civil-law countries. However, it may well be indicative of the situation in other Member 
States given that France and Germany represent two of the main civil-law families 
(Romanistic and Germanic) from which other civil-law systems are derived.86 A more 
comprehensive historical and comparative analysis, whilst desirable, is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. Nevertheless, the following discussion is relevant when considering how the 
common law and civil law came to adopt wholly divergent and opposing opinions on the 
issue of claw-back. 
It is interesting to note that the nature of ownership and property in Europe has a common 
historical origin with the introduction of feudalism in Europe. From this it seems that there 
was little inherent in the feudal law or the concepts of property and ownership themselves 
to indicate why the common-law and continental European legal systems took such a 
divergent approach, over time, to the issue of claw-back. It is rather the way in which 
property law has developed in these countries that has resulted in modern-day divergences 
on this issue. This section will attempt to advance a thesis based on the relationship 
between the family and property ownership in the English common-law and certain civil-
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law systems in order to explain these differing approaches. In addition to this, it will 
attempt to chart these developments in order better to understand current differences.  
The current view of the family as a unit in French Law seems to have its origins in ancient 
traditions that do not appear to exist in England. According to one French legal historian:  
The modern family is derived from the old patriarchal family...The ancient 
family communities were associations of relatives giving one another 
support and assistance under all circumstances...The immovable belongings 
of the community are inalienable, indivisible and cannot be disposed of by 
will...This primitive type of the family community has left traces 
everywhere. It is as a relic of the primitive community that the Roman law 
designates children as its heirs.87
  
This implies a concept of family ownership, which is consonant with the conception of the 
family as a unit, discussed earlier. This is confirmed by the same legal historian who goes 
on to say:  
According to an opinion which was very generally accepted a short time 
ago which today has many adversaries, the ownership of land must have 
originated in the tribe and the clan, and then have passed to the family, and 
finally to the individual. The disagreement on this subject is as to whether 
the collective ownership of the tribe did or did not precede family joint 
ownership; but there can be no doubt that the first owner of the soil was not 
the individual.88  
This view, whilst readily acceptable as an explanation for the French approach to the law 
of property does not resonate so well in the context of English legal history. As the pre-
eminent authority in this area puts it:  
in the present state of our knowledge we should be rash were we to accept 
'family ownership', or in other words a strong form of 'birth-right', as an 
institution which once prevailed among the English in England.89 
Whilst this may well be true, this thesis aims to illustrate how close, in practice, the law of 
property in England was to early French property law and that, perhaps as a result of the 
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different approaches to family ownership, over time these two systems began to diverge 
resulting in the seemingly diametrically opposite systems that exist today.  
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2.3.3 Early restrictions on the freedom of inter vivos alienation  
The modern-day power that exists in many continental legal systems, which allows a 
forced heir to recover a gift that the deceased made during his lifetime (claw-back), has its 
origins in restrictions that existed during feudal times on the power to alienate land. These 
restrictions existed in both continental Europe and in England. As regards the former, 
sources in the English language are limited. However, one can discern from the French 
legal historian already referred to that a landowner's relatives in France had a considerable 
interest in his property and a considerable say over whether that property could be 
alienated: 
The right of the relatives over the family possessions is not only shown by 
the power to collect them by means of intestate succession, that is to say, 
after the death of their actual owner; it is also shown during the lifetime of 
the latter...It is especially in the institution of the repurchase by a person of 
the same lineage and the hereditary reservation, which are so widespread, 
that the rights of the relative come to light.90  
The right of repurchase, or retrait lignager, 91 although it no longer exists in France, seems 
to be the precursor to claw-back. This illustrates, therefore, the strong rights of heirs in 
their ancestors property, which appears to derive from the emphasis placed on family 
ownership. 
In order to understand the prominence of claw-back in the Napoleonic civil code, it is 
necessary to explain the pre-Revolutionary legal situation in France and the impact of 
Roman and other laws in its subsequent development. In this regard, it is important to 
highlight the division within France between the northern part of the country, which was 
governed by customary law, and southern France, which was governed by written law. The 
former derived from customs of Germanic tribes, whereas the latter was based more on 
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Roman law. Despite this, Roman law was a persuasive source of law even in the north and 
was used to fill in gaps in the customary law.92 On this reading, therefore, the movement to 
unify the various competing local laws in France, which resulted in the Civil Code, would 
have had to reconcile the divergent approaches of customary and roman law: 
[The French Civil Code was] the culmination of centuries of legal history 
and the interaction of Roman law with the localized and customary laws 
that evolved in Europe after the fall of Rome.93 
This interaction between customary law and Roman law in France is evident in the 
codifications of customary law that took place in the sixteenth century. 
The process of codification was, however, intermixed with law reform so that ‘it was 
difficult to draw a sharp distinction between legislation in the sense of making new law 
and mere codification or publication of existing custom’.94 During this time of codification 
Roman law seems to have been used to fill the gaps in, and even modify, the customary 
law. For example, as a result of feudalism, which formed part of French customary law, 
primogeniture was the rule that governed intestate succession.95 This, however, conflicted 
with the desire to allow all the children to inherit and was subsequently modified in light of 
Roman law.  
Therefore, the concept of legitime, whereby forced heirs are entitled to a compulsory 
portion of the estate upon the death of the deceased, seems to have become entrenched in 
French law as a result of the codification of customary law. This cannot wholly be 
attributed to Roman law because customary law was based on the customs of the Germanic 
tribes and only indirectly drew on Roman law, as discussed above. Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the inclusion of forced heirship provision in French customary 
law resulted partly from the influence of Roman law and partly as a residue of family 
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ownership that existed in early Germanic tribes, as discussed earlier.96 
This is important because it relates directly to the development of claw-back in France. In 
southern France, legitime formed part of the law because that was based on Roman law. In 
Northern France, however, there were varying customs that prevailed in the different 
regions until they were unified by the ‘Parlement of Paris’, which established legitime as 
part of the Custom of Paris.97 Given that the Custom of Paris was the dominant custom in 
France, when its protection of the legitimate part was extended to inter-vivos gifts (i.e. 
claw-back) in 1688, this had an influence on other customary laws. So much so that ‘by the 
seventeenth century the legitime, as a limitation on the power to disinherit close relatives’ 
and by implication claw-back ‘was conceived by most persons to have a secure place in 
that ideal construct, the “common law of the customs” of France’.98 This resulted in royal 
legislation in 1731, which allowed for the reduction of excessive inter-vivos gifts99 and 
subsequently influenced the drafting of the French civil code: 
It was taken for granted without debate that if the guarantees were to be 
effective they could not be restricted to testamentary gifts, as they had been 
in classical Roman law, but must be carried back to inter vivos gifts that 
brought the owner’s total gifts above the disposable quota.100 
Whilst this is only a rough sketch of the situation that existed in France, due to the lack of 
authority on the matter, this situation is more clearly illustrated by contrast to the history of 
English law, on which there are a number of readily-available sources.  
The position in English law, dates right back to the Norman Conquest and the early history 
of feudal law in England. At that time, feudal tenure was the dominant interest in land 
rather than ownership. This meant that a tenant could be in possession (seisin) of the land 
in return for providing services to the lord of the land but was unable to transfer the land 
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either during his lifetime, without the consent of the lord, or by will. In addition, prior to 
the Norman Conquest, a tenant's heir would not succeed to his ancestor's interest in the 
land, as a matter of legal right:  
Among the Saxons, there is not the least reason to believe, that the grants 
under the lords were at all hereditary ... Even the law of forfeiture of king 
Canute, and afterwards of Edward the confessor, so much talked of among 
lawyers, proves beyond contradiction, that the grants under the lords were 
not hereditary.101  
This state of affairs persisted until the time of the Norman Conquest, where the laws of 
Normandy were imported into England. This represented a considerable departure from 
what had gone before because the feudal law of Normandy was more developed at that 
time than that of England. As a result, ‘the whole fiefs102 of the nation’ became 
hereditary.103  
As a result of the hereditary nature of feudal tenures, there were two main restrictions 
on a tenant's ability to alienate the land: the lord's consent and the heirs’ consent. As 
one eighteenth century writer on the feudal law states:  
The consent of the lord was absolutely necessary to the tenant's alienation, 
to prevent the introduction of an enemy or unqualified person into the fief; 
but the consent of the lord alone was not sufficient, if there were in being 
any persons entitled to the succession. Thus if A. Is himself the first 
purchaser of a fee, and hath a son, his alienation, even with the consent of 
the lord, would hold good only during his own life; but if he had aliened 
with the consent of the lord before issue had, this should be valid, and bind 
the issue born afterwards. For here the alienation was made by all the 
persons in being interested in the land.104
 
 
In the course of the twelfth and thirteenth century, the law changed and became more 
liberalised in both these regards. There existed a distinction between conquest (purchased 
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lands) and lands acquired by descent (i.e. inherited lands). Under a statute passed during 
the Reign of Henry I,105 the former could be alienated without the consent of the heir, 
which is an implicit power that can be traced back to the The Books of the Feus106
 
and 
Anglo-Saxon law.107 During the reign of Henry II, this was clarified to extend to only part 
of the purchased lands, so that the heir could not be disinherited.108
 
However, if the 
purchaser has no children, then he is free to alienate all of his purchased land. Although 
this was generally also the position in Scotland,109 the laws of certain boroughs in Scotland 
made no distinction between whether a purchaser had children or not, preferring instead a 
more extensive freedom of alienation.110
 
 
However, whilst the laws of Henry I gave an express power to alienate part of the 
purchased lands, it also clarified that inherited lands could not be alienated without the 
consent of the heir, which was in line with the prevailing customs in England. This right 
was given more force, during the reign of Henry II, as the common law developed causes 
of action that would allow the right to be enforced in the common-law courts:  
In the case of free tenants, however, these customs rapidly gave way in the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries to the certainty of the common law...[which] 
protected inheritance as a right, by means of the writs of right and assize of 
mort d'ancestor ...111 
Therefore, the ancient feudal law was modified by English custom, which was then 
enshrined by the English common law. The resulting transformation meant that by the 
thirteenth century, prospective heirs had undergone a legal empowerment. They had gone 
from having no legal interest in their ancestors' property under the early feudal system to a 
                                                 
105
 Law of Henry 1 no. 70; See J Dalrymple (n 109) 97.  
106
 T Craig, The Jus Feudale, with an appendix containing the Book of the Feus (W Hodge, Edinburgh 1934) 
289. 
107
 Law of Alfred no. 41 <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/560-975dooms.html#The Laws of King 
Alfred> accessed September 2010. 
108
 See J Beams (tr), R Glanville, Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Kingdom of England (A.J. Valpy, 
London 1812) book 7 Chapter 1. 
109
 See Regiam Majestatem (n 74) Book 2 Chapter 20 
110
 Leges Quatuor Burgorum no. 45. See J Dalrymple (n 109) 99. 
111
 J Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (4th edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007) 263. 
57 
 
legal right to inherit, enforceable before a court of law, during the reign of Henry II. At the 
same time, tenants' freedom to purchase land had also increased.  
This combination of the legal interest that the heir had in inherited land and the 
liberalisation of the tenant's power to alienate purchased land suggests that, at this stage, 
the property system in England was moving away from the early system of feudal tenure 
based on mere possession, towards a system closer to full ownership;  
At this point we may even dare to say the law has begun to recognise 
something like ownership in the tenant...In non-feudal language, seisin has 
become the bare fact of possession, as against the hereditary legal right of 
the owner.112 
Various suggestions have been advanced for why such a transformation occurred. In one 
sense, the movement towards a system that resembled property ownership resulted from a 
change in the economic basis of society. During the lifetime of the feudal system, England 
has seen a shift from a society of hunters and shepherds, through an economy based on 
agriculture, where ownership of land took on a new importance, to the rise of commerce, 
where the freedom to transfer ownership in land is of crucial significance.113 As discussed 
above, however, this change did not eradicate pre-existing customs regarding an heir's 
entitlement to inherit, which were given weight in practise during Henry II’s reign and 
later further enshrined in law, which will be discussed below.  
In addition to the change in the economic situation in England, religion played a part in the 
rise of the freedom to alienate land. As one legal historian comments:  
In the reign of William Rufus a particular matter occurred, which opened a 
way for alienation without the lords consent, and occasioned a prodigious 
revolution in the landed property of Europe. This was the madness of 
engaging in crusades for the recovery of the Holy Land...These pilgrims, 
who affirmed the cross, had no way of defraying the expense, but by the 
sale of their lands, which their lords, if disinclined, dared not to gainsay, or 
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obstruct so pious a work.114
 
 
Whilst the change in economic conditions resulted in the increased sale of land as the basis 
of commerce, the power of the church resulted in more and more gifts of land. The church 
seems to have used this power to great effect and is one of the main forces that resulted in 
the erosion of restrictions on the freedom to alienate property:  
The evidence is persuasive that in some early Germanic communities no 
one had any power at all to give away inherited land ...After their 
conversion to Christianity, the church exerted strong pressure to overcome 
such restrictions, considering gifts for pious causes to be an imperative of 
religious duty.115 
By the thirteenth century, therefore, England reached a stage where there were two 
competing forces at work in the development of property law. On the one hand, there was 
pressure based on economic considerations and from the church towards a high degree of 
freedom to alienate land; on the other hand, however, there is the weight of English 
custom, as protected by Henry II's common-law causes of action, in favour of protecting 
family inheritance rights. This tension is concisely summarised in the leading treatise on 
early English legal history:  
In course of time, as wealth is amassed, there are purchasers for land; also 
there are bishops and priests desirous of acquiring land by gift and willing 
to offer spiritual benefits in return. Then the struggle begins, and law must 
decide whether the claims of expectant heirs can be defeated. In the past 
those claims have been protected not so much by law as by economic 
conditions. There is no need of a law to prohibit men from doing what they 
do not want to do; and they have not wanted to sell or give away their 
land.116
 
 
This problem was exacerbated by the erosion of the rights of the lord and his ability to 
prevent the transfer of land by his tenant. Once land had become inheritable, a tenant 
needed to overcome the additional hurdle of acquiring his heir's consent as well as that of 
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his lord. However, during the course of the thirteenth century the latter requirement 
became less and less, through the practise of subinfeudation, until it was extinguished 
altogether. 
As one commentator explains: 
Subinfeudation involved a gift by the donor directly to the donee who, if a 
layman, thus became tenant of the donor...Thus the donor’s right in the land 
was extinguished, and a lay donee would become the tenant of the donor’s 
lord.117 
The elimination of the requirement of obtaining the lord's consent before alienating lands 
put pressure on removing the final remaining hurdle to the freedom of alienation, namely 
the heir's consent. However, as a result of the exponential rise in land transfers, that 
underpinned this pressure, the law had a converse reaction and, in fact, restricted such 
transfers:  
The propensity to alienation even in the military holdings of both nations, 
grew so great, that in the reign of Henry III it became requisite to restrain it 
by law. This restraint was contained in a clause of the Magna Charta and 
was afterwards, in the time of William the Lion transplanted into the 
statutes of Scotland.118 
The English translation of the provision of Magna Carta119 provides that ‘No Free-man 
shall, from henceforth, give or sell any more of his land, but so that of the residue of his 
lands, the Lord of the fee may have the service due to him which belongeth to the fee’.120  
This persisted until the reign of Richard I, during which time the Quia Emptores Terrarum 
was enacted, which provides a much more extensive power of alienation:  
From henceforth it shall be lawful to every Freeman to sell at his own 
pleasure his Lands and Tenements, or part of them; so that the Feoffee shall 
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hold the same Lands or Tenements of the Chief Lord of the same Fee, by 
such Service and Customs as his Feoffor held before.121  
It seems to be the case in England that, as part of the growing swing toward the freedom to 
alienate land, the common-law protection of the heir was thrown out with the bath water 
along with the consent of the lord. This is partly due to the rise in warranties, which were 
initially made by the lord and latterly were granted by a tenant and his heirs.122 Therefore, 
whilst the powers of the heir on the continent were becoming more extensive through the 
retrait lignager, mentioned previously, the common-law protection of the position of the 
heir that once existed was being neglected. The zealous enforcement of these rights by the 
continental French Courts123
 
notwithstanding, the common-law courts’ indifference to this 
can be explained with reference to the fact that until the time of death, the identity of a 
person's heirs cannot yet be known as various events might intercede before that point.124 
As Glanville puts it, 'Heirs are made by God not man: solus Deus fadt haeredem’.125 In 
this regard, succession is analogous to bankruptcy; just as debts crystallise upon 
bankruptcy, so too do inheritance rights only crystallise upon death.  
Whilst the rights and powers of the heir during the lifetime of his ancestor were eliminated 
relatively early on, their rights upon death persisted until sometime later. The first of these 
was the restriction on the alienation of land by will, established by the Statutes of 
Mortmain and not abolished until the Statute of Wills 1540. Furthermore, the last vestige 
of customary legal rights that allocated a fixed share of the deceased's estate upon death to 
the widow and children was abolished in 1692. Until then, this practise existed in the 
province of York and continues to do so in Scotland. 
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The discussion so far has focussed on land because that has been the subject of most of the 
historical analysis and commentary. This corresponds to the relative importance of 
ownership of land throughout the course of history as compared with moveables or 
chattels. Moveables, by their very nature, are more easily and readily transferrable than 
land. There was also not the same dynastic interest in keeping moveables in the family as 
there was with land. Therefore, the same restrictions on the alienation of chattels did not 
seem to arise because they were not necessary. As one commentator, discussing the history 
of the Germanic inheritance system puts it: 
The private ownership of chattels evolved earlier than that of land, because 
chattels were the subject of a more exclusive personal interest. Although 
private ownership of both chattels and land was derived from the collective 
ownership…it was difficult to conceive of a complete freedom of ownership 
of land. Thus there always persisted numerous restrictions on the ownership 
of land: by reason of vicinage or of lordship, in the interest of the state and 
in favour of other individuals or group.126  
There was not, however, complete freedom of alienation of chattels in the early Germanic 
customs. There still existed a form of legal rights, whereby the children and spouse of the 
deceased were entitled to a share of his or her estate.  
Since these early customs, the restraints, in favour of family members, on the inter-vivos 
transfer of property has undergone a transformation. In modern-day France, for example, 
the retrait lignager, which, as discussed above, once existed as a right of pre-emption or 
repurchase of the sale of land has disappeared. This has been replaced by claw-back, which 
is confined to inter vivos gifts and extends to both land and moveables. Extending the 
family restraints on the alienation of property from land to moveables would seem to have 
been relatively unproblematic because the majority of land descended, under the law of 
succession in the same way as moveables. There was not the same tension, as was present 
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in English law (and Scotland), between the rise of primogeniture in land and, as discussed 
below, the customary tripartite division of moveables. As one commentator puts it: 
From a very early time there was a great distinction between the French and 
the Scots law as to succession to heritage, a distinction which has had 
enormous effect upon the history of the two countries. In Scotland the two 
cardinal rules of feudal succession - viz. (1), preference for males; and (2), 
primogeniture, - applied from the first to all heritage. So it did in Normandy 
(Brissaud, p. 715, note 2) and England. But in far the greater part of France 
this was otherwise. It was only lands held upon a certain feudal tenure - 
terres nobles - which went to the eldest son. Other lands - terres roturieres - 
did not descend "noblement." They were divided like moveables.127 
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2.3.4 Legal Rights and Claw-back in Scotland 
The concept of legitime (or legal rights) in France seems to have its origins in Roman 
law.128 It is viewed as a right of succession, whereby forced heirs are entitled to a 
compulsory portion of the deceased’s estate. This is seen as a mechanism to avoid the 
possibility of heirs being disinherited. Legitim does not, however, prevent the deceased 
giving away property during his or her lifetime. In order to take into account this 
possibility, there exists the power of claw-back in French law, through which a forced heir 
can raise an action to recover an inter vivos gift after the deceased’s death in order to 
satisfy his or her compulsory portion. Given how seriously French law treats the family 
unit, legal rights and claw-back are seen as inextricably linked as a means of preventing 
forced heirs from being disinherited, despite the fact that claw-back did not exist in 
classical Roman law. Therefore, it is interesting that, although the concept of legal rights 
exists in Scotland, we have no power equivalent to claw-back. The reasons for this lie in 
the historical evolution of these concepts in Scotland. 
It is difficult to determine the precise origin of legal rights in Scotland due to limited 
historical sources. As a result there are several competing theories as to their possible 
origin. Any attempt to evaluate these competing theories would require an in-depth 
analysis of primary historical documents, which, due to time and word constraints, is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is possible, on the basis of a critical survey of 
pre-existing historical analysis, to identify the likely origins of legal rights in Scotland and 
assess the relevance of this for any discussion about the lack of claw-back in Scots law. 
The first theory to rule out is that the concept of legal rights might be indigenous to 
Scotland. As one writer notes: 
                                                 
128J Gardner (n 63) 12. 
64 
 
There does not appear to be any evidence in the early Celtic laws (which 
seem at one time to have been prevalent in most of Scotland) of a widow 
and children having any claims on a deceased’s estate which would act as 
restraints on his freedom of testing.129 
This seems quite plausible considering that the predominant, although not the only, law 
relating to succession that applied in Celtic Scotland (i.e. the law of Tanistry) ‘did not 
recognise [the widow and children] as successors’.130 The Celtic laws in Scotland probably 
persisted until the mid-tenth century.131 After which, there began to be a distinct Anglo-
Saxon, and subsequent Norman, influence on the law of Scotland. 
Despite this, the existence of legal rights in Scotland is clearly evidenced in the early 
fourteenth century: 
When any man in time of sickness wishes to make his will, if he is solvent 
all his moveables fall to be divided into three equal parts, of which one goes 
to his heir, one to his wife, and one is reserved to be disposed of by the 
testator as he pleases.132 
This predates the main thrust of the reception of Roman law in Scotland, which influenced 
such seventeenth century writers as Stair.133 Therefore, whilst such a rule as legal rights 
may seem to be derived from Roman law as contained in the Corpus Juris Civilis and 
brought to Scotland during the Reformation, it seems more likely that it existed from a 
much earlier stage and is derived from the canon law or Anglo-Norman law. 
Given that legal rights do not seem to be indigenous to Scotland but were in existence 
before Roman law came to have a profound influence on Scots law it seems likely that 
these rights were imported from England. As discussed above, legal rights existed at one 
time in England and persisted in some regions even beyond their abolition in the rest of the 
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country. The same commentator who discounts legal rights as indigenous to Scotland also 
argues that they are foreign to pre-Anglo-Saxon England: 
It may…be assumed with comparative safety that [this doctrine of 
reasonable parts] was not in existence in England before the Anglo-Saxon 
conquest. It was therefore not indigenous to England any more than it was 
to Scotland, and on that account must have been adopted from some foreign 
source.134 
It is questionable, however, whether these rights were imported during the Anglo-Saxon 
invasion or the Norman Conquest and there are conflicting opinions on the matter. One 
commentator strongly supports the suggestion that the tripartite division of succession 
existed in Anglo-Saxon Scotland long before the Norman invasion, as ‘it existed widely in 
other Germanic races.’135 He bases this argument on the division being present in the law 
of the four burghs, which he contends evidences the Anglo-Saxon law that prevailed all 
over Scotland prior to its coming into existence in the thirteenth century.136 He supports his 
argument with reference to anecdotal evidence attributed to Bede writing at the end of the 
eighth century.137 This lack of definitive facts to prove an Anglo-Saxon origin of this 
tripartite division has been criticised.138 Therefore, it is difficult to be dogmatic about this 
given how difficult it is to find conclusive evidence on the matter. However, the strength of 
the argument is such as to mean that an Anglo-Saxon origin of legal rights in Scotland is at 
least possible. 
A competing argument advanced by another commentator suggests that legal rights were in 
fact introduced into England by the Norman Conquest: 
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We have not the materials for determining with certainty the date and 
manner of the introduction of these rules into Scotland. Probably they were 
brought to us not very long after the Norman Conquest.139  
In support of this contention he cites the similarity of Scottish legal rights and those that 
existed in France. This view is strengthened by another commentator’s strong denunciation 
of the Anglo-Saxon origin theory of legal rights and  endorsement of a Normandian origin 
theory: 
The Professor of Dutch Civil Law and Private International Law at Leyden 
University, Professor E.M.Meyers (who has kindly given the writer 
permission to quote his views on this subject) is emphatically of the opinion 
that the scheme of tripartite division of a deceased’s estate is not a custom 
of Germanic origin…This theory of a Normandian origin is emphatically 
contended by Professor Meyers.140 
Regardless of whether legal rights were introduced by the Anglo-Saxon or Norman 
invasions, it seems that the various commentators agree that this concept was neither 
indigenous to England and Scotland nor introduced during the late-medieval reception of 
Roman law in Scotland. This is supported by one commentator’s response to the Roman 
origin theory: 
It seems to be much more probable that the doctrine of legitim was 
introduced into Scotland from the law of England. For it is a fact that, by 
the old customary law of England (whether derived from the Normans 
about the time of the Conquest or handed down from Saxon times is 
doubtful), a testator, who was survived by wife and children, had his powers 
of bequest restricted to one-third of his personalty. His widow had a right to 
one-third of the estate, and the children to another third - such share being 
called in each case the rationabilis pars. So the law is stated in Glanville, 
and so it existed in the time of Littleton…From Glanville this rule of 
rationabilis pars was copied into the Regiam Majestatem…Accordingly, 
you see, the Scottish doctrine on the subject was virtually the same as that 
of England down to the time of the Reformation.141 
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Therefore, on the balance of the evidence and analysis available, it seems quite probable 
that legal rights came to exist in England either at the time of the Anglo-Saxons or shortly 
after the Norman invasion. If this statement can be accepted, then it seems a plausible next 
step to contend, as has been suggested, that ‘if this rule did not find its way into Southern 
Scotland by means of the English sympathies of the sons of Malcolm Canmore…it must 
almost certainly have crept in not later than the time of David I and very possibly during 
his reign.’142 
Having discussed the origin of legal rights in Scotland (and England), it now seems 
appropriate to discuss in more detail why such rights were extinguished in England but 
persist to this day in Scotland. Such a discussion will feed into an analysis of why legal 
rights exist in Scotland but not claw-back. The reason for such divergence, as will be 
explained below, seems to rest on the differences in succession law that existed between 
Normandy and the rest of France, and the rise of primogeniture in medieval England. 
As discussed above,143 Glanvill wrote about a time in England where legal rights existed. 
The Regiam Majestatem confirms this also to be the case in Scotland. However, by the 
time Bracton was writing, these legal rights had disappeared from the law of England but 
not that of Scotland. The reason these rights came to be extinguished in England seems to 
be the rise of primogeniture. This principle existed in Normandy but was not so extensive 
in the rest of France. In fact, land in the rest of France was divided under succession law in 
a similar way to moveables.144 This was largely due to the number of smaller holdings 
rather than large estates. The same cannot be said of Scotland, however, where 
primogeniture did take hold. 
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Legal rights date back to customs that seek to ensure partible inheritance among all heirs. 
The main aim of primogeniture, however, was that land should pass undivided to the heir 
who is most likely going to be able to manage it, namely the oldest son. The reason these 
rights were not extinguished in Scotland seems to be that the spread of feudalism from 
England into Scotland was very gradual. Therefore, primogeniture did not come to be the 
rule in Scotland until much later. By this time, the reception of Roman law was underway 
in Scotland, which may have entrenched legal rights because they corresponded to the 
Roman law’s legitime. There was no such countervailing influence in England. 
This, however, does not explain why legal rights managed to survive in Scotland but there 
is little trace of claw-back, which is seen as inextricably linked to legal rights on the 
continent. The reason for this is two-fold. Firstly, the nature of land holding had begun to 
change in Scotland (and England) from traditional folk land, with all its family restraints 
on alienation, to book land, which was more freely alienable. As one distinguished 
nineteenth century historian explains: 
The folkland is...land held under the old restrictive common law, the law 
which keeps land in families, as contrasted with land which is held under a 
book...modelled on Roman precedents...making for free alienation and 
individualism.145  
In addition to this, the rise of primogeniture meant that it was incongruous to continue to 
require the heir’s consent to transfer land because this rule was designed to protect a 
system of partible inheritance where all the heirs shared equally. Furthermore, it seems 
clear that whilst England and Scotland were moving toward freedom of alienation, the 
drafters of various continental civil codes enshrined the principle of claw-back in their 
reform of the law. 
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Overall, therefore, the existence of legal rights in Scotland but not England seems to have 
resulted from a combination of the slow spread of feudalism and primogeniture to Scotland 
and the reception of Roman law in that country. Furthermore, the absence of claw-back in 
Scotland but not on the continent has to do with the divergent routes the evolution of 
feudalism and land ownership took in these countries with the rise of primogeniture in 
Scotland and the drafting of continental civil codes as decisive turning points in this 
evolution.   
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2.3.5 Modern-day implications 
The foregoing analysis has attempted to illustrate the modern-day differences between 
France and England as regards legal rights and claw-back in terms of their historical 
evolution in both systems. It now seems appropriate to discuss the reasons why such 
divergences occurred and continue to exist to the present day. As regards legal share, it 
would appear to be a combination of the origin of these rules and the political pressures of 
the day that has resulted in the divergent approaches in both jurisdictions. On the one hand, 
customary protection in continental Europe was reinforced by the reception of Roman law, 
which provided similar protection and this was solidified by the enthusiastic enforcement 
of the codified, written law by the continental European courts. The countervailing 
situation that existed in England was one where unwritten customary law gave way to the 
economic pressure resulting from the rise of commerce and pressure from the church to 
loosen restrictions on both inter vivos and mortis causa transfers of property.  
 
The divergence regarding claw-back is more complex. Although some sort of right of 
repurchase existed initially in both France and England, it became far more extensive in 
the former than it did in the latter. This cannot be attributed to Roman law, which did not 
recognise a right of claw-back:  
Roman law from an early time had adopted the premise that the power of 
fully capable persons to dispose of their asserts by will should be essentially 
unlimited. So the problems of finding redress for the disinherited were 
approached in an extremely roundabout way...légitime [was included] in the 
revised text of the Custom of Paris, which was promulgated in 1580. It was 
somewhat more than a century later, in 1688, that in the Custom of Paris the 
protection of the heir’s “legitimate part” was definitively extended beyond 
wills to inter vivos gifts.146
 
 
This could have numerous explanations. Some attribute it to a quirk of fate or accident 
                                                 
146
 J Dawson (n 97) 39 – 41. 
71 
 
which merely reflects what common-law lawyers and continental lawyers happened to care 
about.147 
 
In the present writer's submission, the divergence over both legal rights and claw-
back partly results from the difference of opinion, between the English common-law and 
continental European legal systems, over the conception of the family as a unit, as 
discussed above.  
Overall, some of the differences of opinion on this issue that exist today 'result from 
decisions made in the distant past and some reflect value judgments that are beyond the 
reach of argument.'148 This is understandable because inheritance law is an area which 
reasonable people disagree over and which involves adopting compromise solutions in 
order to address a range of competing interests:  
... the law had to resolve the conflict between the interests of the living 
family in an extended sense and the dynastic instinct to preserve the unity of 
the patrimony in the male line. There was a similar tension between the 
social desirability of ensuring that land remained freely marketable and the 
paternalistic concern to restrain the rash prodigality of youthful heirs. The 
law therefore had to hold a balance between the living, the dead and the 
unborn.149  
Through the foregoing historical analysis, however, this section has attempted to illustrate 
that the historical origins of these systems are not so far apart and that, in practise, these 
systems have not always been so different. Even nowadays, there exists more commonality 
than is widely believed. Even in the English common-law where freedom of alienation and 
testation are guiding principles, there is a limited, discretionary form of claw-back vested 
in the courts.150  
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2.3 A Possible Way Forward? 
The foregoing analysis suggests that both the civil law countries of continental Europe and 
England’s common-law, which came into existence after the Norman invasion, had a 
similar point of departure on concepts such as the family unit and restrictions on the 
alienation of property. Despite this, these two systems took divergent paths, with the civil 
law fragmenting even further as evidenced by modern-day differences relating to claw-
back. In common-law England, freedom of alienation grew to the detriment of family 
rights in property; on the continent, the reverse was true. This was partly due to differences 
in the patterns of land ownership, partly due to the rise of the common law and partly a 
mere quirk of fate.151  
Scotland’s mixed legal system lies somewhere between the common law’s freedom of 
alienation and the civil-law’s protection of family members. Having been influenced by the 
common law, Scotland lost any family restraints on the inter vivos transfer of property that 
may have existed, as was also the case in England. However, the reception of Roman law 
in Scotland coupled with the slow progression of feudalism ensured that legal rights did 
not die out as they had done in England. 
The system that exists in Scotland was recently reviewed by the Scottish Law Commission, 
which recommended that the legal rights of spouses should remain intact152 but should 
apply not only to moveables but to the entirety of the deceased’s estate.153 The commission 
proposed two options for the legal rights of children. These options were either that fixed 
legal shares for children should remain or that fixed legal shares for adult children should 
be abolished but that dependent children should be able to claim a capital sum.154 
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Ultimately, the Scottish Parliament would have to decide between these two if they came 
to legislate on the matter. The Commission also considered the desirability of introducing 
claw-back into Scotland to protect those entitled to legal rights from disinheritance.155 
According to the report, ‘there was almost unanimous opposition to this idea’ and therefore 
the Commission decided to make no recommendation.156 There have been similar reform 
initiatives in other countries regarding claw-back. In France, for example, since 2006 the 
scope of claw-back has been limited so that it only applies to gifts made within 10 years of 
death rather than 30 and it no longer requires that the actual gift is restored merely its 
value.157 Recent reforms in Germany have meant that the value of a gift that is to be 
restored reduces proportionately with the amount of time that has passed since the gift was 
made.158 It seems that a more limited form of claw-back in these countries, along the lines 
of the Dutch model, may be more desirable. However, any discussion of domestic law 
reform is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how a compromise solution that would be acceptable to 
all Member States could be achieved especially in a private international law instrument. 
Any attempt to limit the scope of claw-back in the Succession Regulation would involve 
the harmonisation of substantive law, which is beyond the competence of the EU. As one 
commentator notes: 
A provision stipulating a maximum period for claw-back claims is very 
unlikely to be permitted, and would be difficult to justify, since it would 
stray beyond the confines of private international law into uniform 
substantive law.159 
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For that, domestic reform would be required. However, that is a politically infeasible and 
unlikely prospect.  
From the UK’s perspective, the most desirable solution would be simply to exclude claw-
back from the scope of the applicable law for those Member States that do not recognise 
such a concept (namely the UK, Ireland and Cyprus). This solution would be similar to that 
adopted in the Maintenance Regulation, which excluded the entirety of maintenance from 
the scope of the applicable law for the UK and Denmark which are not party to the Hague 
Protocol on Applicable Law, because the UK does not apply foreign law to maintenance 
obligations. In a similar vein, whilst the UK does apply foreign law to succession, it does 
not apply it to the effect of a person’s death on their inter-vivos transfers because it views 
this as falling outside the scope of succession.  
Whether this compromise would be a viable option, however, remains to be seen. Civil-law 
Member States may feel that their forced heirship provisions could easily be avoided if 
there are no restrictions on gratuitous lifetime transfers when dealing with property in the 
UK. However, as discussed above, such restrictions were not seen as a necessary corollary 
of forced heirship provisions in Roman law from which legal rights are derived. This is in 
line with the Roman maxim that no person is the heir of a living person.160 Furthermore, in 
insisting that claw-back is excluded from the applicable law, the UK are representing the 
interests of major UK-based charities, who are major recipients of lifetime and mortis 
causa gifts and who strongly oppose the inclusion of claw-back within the Succession 
Regulation.161 
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Civil-law Member States may be unwilling to make such a blanket exception solely for the 
UK, Ireland and Cyprus’s benefit. However, they may be more amenable to a rule, such as 
that which the Max Planck Institute has suggested, which could benefit a number of 
Member States. This would insert article 19a(1) in the following terms: 
The restitution of a lifetime gift from a donee can be claimed under the law 
applicable to the succession according to this Regulation only to the extent 
that restitution could also be claimed under the law which would have 
governed the succession of the donor at the time the gift was made by virtue 
of this Regulation.162 
This putative applicable law approach is more suited to a private international law 
instrument than including substantive limits to the reach of domestic claw-back provisions 
in the Regulation, as discussed above, because a similar effect is achieved through private 
international law, rather than substantive, means. This rule would operate by way of 
exception to the general rule contained in article 16, which provides that: 
Unless otherwise provided for in this Regulation, the law applicable to the 
succession as a whole shall be that of the State in which the deceased had 
their habitual residence at the time of their death.163 
Therefore, the law of the state of the deceased’s habitual residence at the time of death 
would apply to the restitution of inter vivos gifts, unless the law of the state of the 
deceased’s habitual residence at the time of making the gift provided for a less extensive 
form of claw-back. In such a case, the latter law would apply. This approach would protect 
the donee’s legitimate expectations at the time of receiving the gift, which the Max Planck 
institute contends ‘should not rank behind those of persons entitled to mandatory 
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succession rights’.164 This is expanded on by one of the coordinators of the working group 
on international succession law within the Max Planck Institute: 
On the choice-of-law level the uncertainties are further increased by the fact 
that the donee cannot even be assured which law will finally apply to the 
succession of the donor as the donor, after having made the gift, can change 
his habitual residence or choose a different law.165  
This approach is not quite as UK-friendly as excluding claw-back from the scope of the 
applicable law altogether, as discussed above. That regime would essentially be no 
different from the current situation. Civil-law Member States would continue to consider 
claw-back as part of succession and would therefore apply foreign law to the restitution of 
inter vivos gifts and the UK would apply the lex fori to such gifts and therefore not 
recognise claw-back claims. This would put the recipients of gifts, including charities, in 
the United Kingdom in a privileged position as compared with forced heirs because 
regardless of where the deceased was habitually resident at the time of making the gift or at 
death, claw-back claims from his heirs will not be recognised by UK courts.  
This can be contrasted with the other extreme, which is the regime created by the 
Regulation. This would allow all claw-back claims that are permitted under the habitual 
residence of the deceased at death regardless of the legitimate expectations of the 
recipients of gifts. Both situations create unfairness. The current regime could facilitate the 
disinheritance of forced heirs through investing in English trust funds, for example.166 
Whereas the regime that the Regulation would create would frustrate the legitimate 
expectations of the recipients of gifts, which were unimpeachable at the time of receipt, 
but, due to a subsequent change in the donor’s habitual residence, subsequently become 
subject to claw-back. 
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The solution proposed by the Max Planck Institute would seemingly strike a middle 
ground because it would protect the interests of the recipients of gifts, who had no reason 
to suspect that gifts could be subject to claw-back, from a subsequent change in the 
deceased’s habitual residence. In addition to this, it would also protect heirs from being 
disinherited by simply setting up an English trust fund. As one commentator puts it: 
Another possibility might be to refer to the law of habitual residence of the 
deceased at the time that he made the inter vivos disposition. If, by that law, 
the transaction was unimpeachable, then the lex successionis should not be 
permitted to ‘trump’ the inter vivos transaction by allowing any form of 
clawback. This should ensure in most cases parties are unable to avoid 
forced heirship rules of their ‘home’ state by simply alienating their 
property or investing in England.167 
This compromise solution is not entirely unproblematic. A person could still temporarily 
acquire an English habitual residence for the purpose of creating an English trust fund and 
subsequently reacquire their original habitual residence. However, this would be a 
considerable amount of effort to go to simply to disinherit one’s heirs. In addition to this, it 
would mean that the recipients of gifts would have to inquire into the habitual residence of 
the donor. This would not be especially difficult for larger charities or trust fund managers 
who keep thorough records and it is gifts made to these organisations, rather than smaller 
charities and individuals who do not keep such thorough records, that are likely to be 
challenged. 
Therefore, on balance, the Max Planck Institute’s solution may be the best way forward. It 
broadly achieves the ends desired by the UK within the confines of a private international 
law instrument, without overriding the concerns of civil-law Member States. Moreover, it 
is beneficial to those civil-law Member States that provide a less extensive form of claw-
back than others do because it allows them to preserve their own system of claw-back.   
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2.5 Conclusions 
Claw-back is an issue that has a long history and is deeply rooted in a society's culture in a 
similar way to legal rights. Therefore, it evokes a strong emotional response either in 
support of or in opposition to it. Legal rights seem to cause the same diametrically 
opposing opinions depending on whether you support adult offspring's intrinsic right to 
inherit or whether you feel that a person should have the freedom to alienate his or her 
property. Even those who do not support legal rights can, however, accept and recognise 
them because, although it is not a value judgment they would make, they can see that it is 
reasonable to consider that a person's right to dispose of his or her property does not have 
to outweigh his families need to be provided for. Claw-back, however, involves a more 
delicate balancing of interests.  
Whilst claw-back would enhance forced heirs' protection from disinheritance, for those 
who value the security of property transfers more highly, this comes at too great a price to 
protect a value they do not feel needs protecting in the first place. What is more, a 
historical analysis of the evolution of legal rights and claw-back suggests that these two 
concepts have not always been linked. Roman law valued the protection of family 
members from disinheritance but they also valued commerce and the sanctity of property 
transactions. Therefore, a compromise that seemed to work for them was to have legal 
rights but not to subject lifetime property transfers to future actions for reduction. This is a 
system that Scots law, as a mixed legal system, has adopted and one that seems to be a 
middle ground between the common-law's freedom of alienation and the civil-law's 
attempt to protect family members comprehensively from disinheritance.  
In any event, there does not appear to be a consensus as to whether claw-back forms part of 
the law of succession. The reason that claw-back forms part of the law of succession for 
much of continental Europe is due to the way in which customary Germanic and French 
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law combined with Roman law. Whilst similar powers existed in England in the past, these 
powers have since died out and it is questionable whether they ever formed part of the law 
of succession or merely constituted a separate claim.  
Given how deeply claw-back seems to be rooted in a given society’s culture and the lack of 
basic agreement as to whether it constitutes part of the law of succession perhaps excluding 
it from the scope of the Regulation would be the most sensible solution. However, this is 
likely to meet with considerable opposition from a number of Member States. Therefore, 
the solution that may emerge is that of the putative applicable law suggested by the Max 
Planck institute. This, however, is dependent on the measure being proposed and accepted, 
which is far from a certainty. Perhaps a greater awareness of the historical evolution of 
claw-back would lead to greater flexibility resulting in an increased openness to 
compromise solutions.  
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3. Connecting Factor  
3.1 Introduction 
The issue of the appropriate connecting factor is one that affects two of the traditional 
considerations in private international law, applicable law and jurisdiction, and evidences a 
gulf between the common-law and civil-law approach. The question that the Commission’s 
Green Paper posed in relation to both applicable law and jurisdiction was whether a single 
connecting factor should apply to the whole of succession and if so what that connecting 
factor should be.1 The UK Government’s response to this is rather equivocal. They 
highlight the advantages and disadvantages of the various possible connecting factors but 
conclude by saying ‘there is no immediate obvious answer to the question of what 
connecting factor should be applied under a harmonised choice of law rule, if such a rule is 
to be created’.2 
The UK Government seem to demonstrate a preference for the concept of domicile by 
explaining how the concept currently operates in the UK. As they were undoubtedly aware, 
however, given the drawbacks of domicile, as it is currently used in the UK, and its lack of 
use in continental Europe, it was unlikely to appear as a connecting factor in the 
Regulation. In a similar fashion, the French Government, in their response to the 
Commission’s Green Paper show a preference for the concept of Nationality.3 However, 
they also adopt a realistic view of their preferred connecting factor, concluding that its 
disadvantages outweigh its benefits in the international context. Both the UK and French 
Governments seem resigned to the fact that some form of habitual residence would be the 
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most likely connecting factor. However, from the UK’s point of view, recognition of the 
limits of that concept would be necessary. 
Unlike the UK Government’s response, which attempts to discuss all possible connecting 
factors objectively, the French Government fails even to consider the possibility of 
domicile as a connecting factor. This is no doubt due to the fact that, because of political 
considerations, domicile as a connecting factor would be unpalatable in many continental 
European Member States and as such is highly unlikely to appear in the regulation. In the 
present writer’s submission, the civilian systems’ intransigent opposition to domicile as a 
connecting factor and the English common law’s advocacy of this concept is ironic given 
its historical evolution. 
A number of EU Member States use nationality as their main connecting factor both for 
choice-of-law and jurisdictional purposes. This stands in contrast to the position in the 
middle ages where domicile, derived from Roman law, was the main connecting factor. As 
one commentator puts it:  
From the Middle Ages down to the commencement of the modern 
movement for attaching importance in private law to nationality, domicile 
was the chief criterion of territorial law and jurisdiction on the Continent.4 
This section will explore the reasons for the abandonment of domicile in favour of 
nationality, in France in particular, which had a knock-on effect in much of continental 
Europe. The conversion from domicile to nationality was not, however, a comprehensive 
one, at least in France, which left some areas, such as succession, to be determined by 
domicile. Therefore, this chapter will go on to discuss the persistence of domicile as a 
connecting factor in specific areas, alongside nationality, and its subsequent revival as a 
general connecting factor in certain Member States. 
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Nowadays, habitual residence is the main connecting factor used in transnational initiatives 
such as Hague Conventions and EU Regulations and it has even taken hold in some 
national legal systems, the private international law rules of which have recently been 
reformed.5 This chapter will discuss the rise of habitual residence, in both transnational 
initiatives and domestic private international law, and situate this in relation to 
developments relating to domicile and nationality. Some Member States have even gone so 
far as to adopt habitual residence as the main connecting factor for succession in their 
domestic private international law rules. Through a discussion of the definitions of these 
concepts, the chapter will attempt to illustrate that, the factual-based, habitual residence 
can be understood as a revival of the traditional concept of domicile rather than the more 
legalistic English law doctrine. Despite this, however, the way that habitual residence has 
evolved in Europe is such that this ill-defined concept has strayed from its legal roots and 
has lost many of the advantages of domicile. The aim of the following discussion is to 
illustrate that the current dogmatic adherence to the relatively modern concept of an ill-
defined habitual residence in Europe represents the abandonment of a legal concept, which 
has strong roots in the civil law and is still relevant today. On this basis, a well-delineated 
version of habitual residence would seem desirable rather than the loosely-defined version 
of habitual residence that appears in the Regulation. The following section will go on to 
discuss in some detail the reception of the civilian concept of domicile into the English 
common-law. 
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3.2 Reception of Domicile into English and Scots Law 
According to the leading writers of private international law in England6 and Scotland,7 the 
law of the domicile applies to succession in both English and Scots law. As authority for 
the former, the following cases are cited: Pipon v. Pipon; 8 Thorne v. Watkins;9 Bruce v. 
Bruce;10 Balfour v. Scott;11 Somerville v. Somerville.12 The cases that are cited as authority 
for Scots law are: Brown v. Brown;13 Bruce v. Bruce;14 Hog v. Lashley;15 and Balfour v. 
Scott.16 It is noteworthy that some of these cases are authority for both Scots and English 
law and have citations that refer to both Scottish and English case reports. This suggests 
that Scottish and English case law has had a mutual influence in shaping each of these 
legal systems as regards the appropriate connecting factor in private international law of 
succession. The following section will explore this interaction in an attempt to explain the 
process through which the civilian concept of domicile came to be used in common-law 
England and Scotland’s mixed jurisdiction. 
The origin of the use of domicile as a connecting factor in English succession law goes 
right back to the very development of private international law in England. At the time 
Joseph Story wrote his comparative work on conflict of laws in 1834, private international 
law was a subject that had ‘never been systematically treated by writers on the common 
law of England; and, indeed, seems to be of very modern growth in that kingdom.’17 
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Therefore the concept of domicile was not native to English law but rather derived from 
Roman law18 as expounded by the medieval and early modern continental jurists19: 
The word domicile is not found in Viner's Abridgment, Bacon's Abridg-
ment, Comyn's Digest, or in any of the law books from Bracton down to 
Blackstone, so that it must be comparatively new to the English law. It was 
in fact borrowed from the continental usage and after it had there become 
the determining factor in questions of law. When we borrowed the notion of 
personal law, we found that domicile was established as its criterion.20 
Despite this, by the time of Lord Campbell’s dicta in an 1845 House of Lords case, the 
concept of domicile was firmly a part of English law: 
[T]he doctrine of domicile has sprung up in this country very recently, 
and…neither the Legislature nor the Judges, until within a few years 
thought much of it; but it is a very convenient doctrine, it is now well 
understood…21 
The origin of the recognition of foreign laws in English courts dates back to the fourteenth 
century and the early days of the High Court of Admiralty in matters relating to mercantile 
contracts.22 However, apart from in the mercantile courts, the rules designating the 
applicable foreign law ‘were almost unknown in the English [common-law] courts, prior to 
the time of Lord Hardwicke and Lord Mansfield.’23 This is supported by comments to that 
effect in Scottish case law. 24 
Both of these eminent judges played a decisive role in the development of private 
international law in England. Despite the fact that the influence of continental jurists on 
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English law has been attributed to Story,25 it seems to be the case that these learned judges 
were aware of the continental writings and considered them as persuasive in deciding cases 
that came before them. In the 1760 case of Robinson v Bland,26 for example, Lord 
Mansfield cited Huber and Voet in order to resolve the question of which law governs the 
recovery of a gambling debt incurred in Paris: 
The parties had a view to the laws of England. The law of the place can 
never be the rule where the transaction is entered into with an express view 
to the law of another country, as the rule by which it is to be governed. 
Huberi Praelectiones, Lib. 1 tit. 3, pa. 34 is clear and distinct...Voet speaks 
to the same effect.27  
The significance of Lord Mansfield’s reference to the works of continental jurists is not 
diminished by the fact that the law of France and England were deemed to be the same on 
this point and therefore the determination of the applicable law was not necessary. 
There is a footnote in the case report, where the editor refers to Lord Hardwicke’s 
judgment in the 1744 case of Pipon v. Pipon as authority for the proposition that ‘A man’s 
personal estate, is distributable according to the laws of that country, where he dwells.’ As 
discussed below,28 the reasoning that prompted Lord Hardwicke to reach this conclusion is 
not clear and there is no reference to foreign jurists in the case report of Pipon. Therefore, 
it is difficult to know whether Lord Hardwicke would have been aware of the writings of 
continental jurists and have been influenced by them even though he did not explicitly 
refer to them. On the one hand, given Lord Mansfield’s knowledge of continental jurists, it 
may seem reasonably likely that Lord Hardwick’s knowledge of their writings lead him to 
apply the law of the domicile. On the other hand, however, Lord Mansfield’s familiarity 
with continental legal writings may have resulted from his practice in Scottish appeals 
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before the House of Lords and his familiarity with Scots law.29 Therefore, this awareness 
of continental doctrine may not have been shared by Lord Hardwicke and other judges: 
It is evident that the English judges were not at this time familiar with these 
discussions, for Dennison J. declared that this case and the law upon it were 
quite new to him, and that he could form no opinion upon it.30 
Occasional references to continental jurists from the bench notwithstanding, it seems that it 
was far from common in the English courts to consider these writings as any kind of 
authority: 
I am not aware that the works of these eminent jurists have been cited at the 
English bar; and I should draw the conclusion that they are in a great 
measure, if not altogether, unknown to the studies of Westminster Hall.31 
This stands in contrast to the position in Scotland, where courts demonstrated a willingness 
early on to hear arguments based on the citation of continental jurists. 32 
This contrast between the approaches of the Scottish and English courts can be seen in the 
early cases in each jurisdiction, which decided that the law of the domicile governs 
succession to moveable property. As mentioned above, the relevant English case is that of 
Pipon v. Pipon33 in 1744 and the earliest Scottish case on the matter seems to be the 
contemporaneous case of Brown v. Brown.34 Brown serves as an illustration of the Scottish 
Courts’ willingness to fill the gaps in Scots law with reference to continental legal 
thinking.35 Pipon, on the other hand, demonstrates the corresponding lack of a well-
articulated, principled approach to the issue in the English courts. 
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Brown concerned a Scottish domiciled deceased who owned Irish government debentures. 
Under the terms of the debenture, the money was to be repaid to the deceased, his 
executors, administrators or assignees. By the law of Scotland, this passed to the 
deceased’s brother as his next of kin. This, however, was challenged by the deceased’s 
nephew, who claimed that by the law of Ireland, he was entitled to a share. In deciding the 
case, the judges of the Inner House of the Court of Session recognised that it was to be 
decided on the basis of what it called “the law of nations” and by that law, the law of the 
domicile of the creditor governs the succession of such debts which are moveable. 
Therefore, Scots law was applied and the contention that the lex situs, which applies to 
immoveables, should govern moveables instead of the lex domicillii was implicitly 
rejected. This, therefore, is the origin of the scission system that persists to this day. 
Unlike Robinson v Bland, where Lord Mansfield clearly states the reasoning that he found 
persuasive, there is no indication in the case report of Brown of the reasoning that supports 
the judges’ conclusion in that case. However, unlike Pipon counsel cite continental jurists 
(such as Voet) in their pleadings. Therefore some indication of the reasons supporting the 
Court’s decision can be discerned from this. This suggests that it was established practice 
in the Scottish courts not just for the judges to be cognisant of foreign legal doctrine, as the 
English judges seem also to have been, but also that foreign jurists were cited as persuasive 
authority, which seems to have been alien in the English courts.36 
This is illustrated by Pipon which not only illustrates the lack of reference to foreign jurists 
in counsel’s pleadings but also seems to suggest a reluctance on the part of Lord 
Hardwicke to discuss continental legal thinking, even though he may well have been aware 
of it. In Pipon the Court of Chancery acknowledged the potential for enunciating a general 
rule but deliberately shied away from that, opting instead to dispose of the case on 
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pragmatic grounds that could not be broadly generalized. The intestate deceased was a 
native inhabitant of Jersey, where he had considerable personal estate as well as one debt 
owing in England. The plaintiffs were his nephews and nieces and the defendants were his 
sisters. The dispute concerned whether the debt that had been collected in England was 
distributable according to the law of Jersey (which excluded the nephews and nieces) or 
the law of England (which did not). The plaintiffs’ action was to have the distribution of 
the debt done in England according to English law. The court dismissed the case stating 
that the plaintiffs were not entitled to seek distribution of a particular part of the estate but 
only to hold the general administrator to account for the whole estate. Therefore, as the 
general administrator was not present, the case was dismissed. 
As indicated above, it seems, on reading the case report, that any decision regarding which 
law governs succession was obiter and that the true ratio of the case was simply that an 
action for the distribution of a particular part of an intestate’s estate is inadmissible. 
However, the editor of the case report of Robinson v Bland seems to disagree and Lord 
Hardwicke himself stated in a subsequent case37 that he had decided in Pipon that the law 
of the domicile applies. In any event Lord Hardwicke’s comments in Pipon are certainly 
relevant to the current discussion: 
I am unwilling to decide the general question in this case…therefore I 
choose to determine the case without entering into it. If I was to enter into 
the general question, I should think that a man’s personal estate is supposed 
to follow his person, wherever he is and is distributable according to the law 
of that country where his person is…[Here] the question is whether [the 
debt in England] shall be considered as part of the bulk of his personal 
estate to be accounted for according to the laws of the place where he is 
resident or whether any persons not resident in England, but inhabitants of a 
foreign country, who by the laws of that foreign country, have no right to 
any part, but would have a right by the laws of England, can come into this 
Court, and, by reason of the taking out administration here, can compel that 
administrator to account to them for this part of the personal estate, 
abstracted from the residue of that estate. If that was the mere question 
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before me, I should incline to think (but I do not mean to give an opinion to 
bind me) that it could not be done…38   
Regardless of whether Lord Hardwicke’s comments were obiter or ratio they have been 
treated as reflecting the law of the land in subsequent cases,39 and as such have been 
converted into binding precedent. However it is noteworthy that, unlike in Brown, no 
reference was made to continental scholars either in the judgment or in the pleadings of 
counsel. 
Lord Hardwicke’s position as regards the law of the domicile governing succession is 
clarified in the subsequent case of Thorne v. Watkins,40 and the suggestion that he is aware 
of foreign legal doctrine is strengthened by his comments in that case. In Thorne Lord 
Hardwicke, again sitting in the Court of Chancery, adopts a clear preference for the lex 
domicilii. The case concerned a man who resided in Scotland, but was domiciled in 
England, at the time of his death leaving the residue of his personal estate in his will to his 
nephews and nieces. One of the nephews entitled to a share of the estate and residing in 
England died there. The defendant was one of the executors to the uncle’s estate and 
because he was a relative of the nephew obtained letters of administration in England to 
William’s estate too. The executor contended that the part of the nephew’s estate, which 
came from his uncle in Scotland should be distributed according to the law of Scotland. 
This was challenged by a half-blood relative of the nephew who would not stand to inherit 
if the law of Scotland applied.  
In answering the question whether the part of a domiciled Englishman’s estate that 
includes debts due in Scotland should be governed by Scots law, Lord Hardwicke states 
the following: 
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That never was thought of, and would create confusion. And this question 
relates not to the articles of union, which indeed preserve the laws of the 
different countries, the jurisdiction, forums, and tribunals of each country; 
but this question would be the same after as before the union of the two 
crowns, and would be the same on a question of this sort arising in France 
or Holland; whether to be distributable according to the laws of those 
countries, or of England. The reason is that all debts follow the person, not 
of the debtor in respect of the right or property, but of the creditor to whom 
due.41 
Whilst this clarifies any doubt that may have remained after Pipon, there is equally little 
indication of the reasoning that supports this conclusion and the role that foreign legal 
thinking might have played in coming to that decision. 
These early cases, in both Scotland and England, are useful indications of the state of the 
law in this area at that time. However, they do not convey the complete picture. Robinson 
indicated that English judges at that time were at least aware of continental legal writings. 
Pipon and Thorne, however, do not shed much light on how influential they were in 
deciding that the law of the domicile applies to succession. In Scotland, Brown illustrates 
that the established practise was that continental legal writings were cited as persuasive 
authority where there was a lacuna in Scots law. However, as a result of inadequate case 
reports, we do not know how persuasive the Scottish judges found these arguments. Indeed 
for a period after Brown the Scottish courts took a divergent approach, applying the lex 
situs  rather than the lex domicilii to the succession of moveables.42 
There could be various explanations for this anomaly. Perhaps, as has been suggested, the 
system of precedent simply was not as firmly established then as it is now.43 The Court of 
Session may, therefore, have considered the matter not to have been definitively decided. 
This seems reasonable because, although the subsequent case of MacHargs v. Blain44 
supports the decision in Brown, the institutional writers were divided on the issue: some 
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rejected distribution according to the law of the domicile;45 whilst others contended that 
the lex domicilii applied.46  
Various other suggestions have been made. In Hog v. Lashley,47 for example, it was argued 
that the Court in these cases had misunderstood English law on the matter. Support for this 
can be drawn from one commentator, who, when discussing an earlier English case, 
suggests that the then Attorney-General made a statement indicating that effects situated in 
England were governed by the law of England.48 This, however, does not seem a very 
credible explanation for three reasons. Firstly, the Attorney General was most likely 
referring to the administration of estates rather than the succession of moveables. 
Secondly, there was clear English authority that the law of the domicile applied and 
thirdly, not all of the cases concerned a Scottish/English conflict. For example, Davidson v. 
Elcherson49 in 1788, the first of these cases, concerned the property of a Scotsman that was 
situated in Hamburg. It was held that the law of Hamburg applied in that case and that no 
action for distribution was competent before the Court of Session. This case could, 
however, have been a decision on jurisdiction rather than choice of law and the Court may 
simply have declined jurisdiction because there was already a case before the courts in 
Hamburg.         
An additional explanation, which Beaumont and Bremner suggest, that may explain some 
of the cases decided by the Court of Session between Brown and Bruce is that they may 
have been based on the inference of an implied choice of law: 
This suggestion is highly speculative and difficult, if not impossible, to 
confirm given the lack of judicial reasoning recorded in the early case 
reports. However, it does at least present a possible explanation, which is 
consistent with an analysis of the skeletal case reports that exist. In 
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Davidson, it was argued that, unlike when dealing with testate succession, 
the will of the deceased is irrelevant in intestate succession because it 
occurs by operation of law. The inference there seems to be that when there 
is a will one looks at the intention of the parties.  
Although we do not have a record of the judicial reasoning in the case of 
MacHargs v. Blain it seems reasonable to infer that such a principle was 
applied there. In that case, a Scotsman created a will in Scotland that 
conveyed property in Antigua and it was held that the Antiguan property 
passed according to Scots law. Similarly, in the case of Henderson v. 
Mclean, a Scotsman created an Indian will transferring property in India and 
it was held that the property was to pass according to the law in force in 
India, which, at that time was English law. Therefore these cases, whilst 
seemingly contradictory, with the former favouring the lex domicilii and the 
latter the lex situs, could be explained on the basis that the court was 
honouring the principle of party autonomy as indicated by an implied 
choice of law by the parties in the creation of a will in a particular legal 
system.50 
In any event, whatever the reasons may have been for the divergent course that the Court 
of Session took after Brown, the matter was rectified by the subsequent House of Lord case 
of Bruce v. Bruce.51 
Bruce, decided in 1790, was a Scottish appeal where the House of Lords definitively 
decided that the lex domicilii governed the succession of moveable property. The case 
concerned a Scotsman who died in India, whilst working for the English East Indian 
Company, leaving property in England, India and on the sea. It was determined that the 
deceased had an English domicile at the time of his death and therefore the succession to 
his moveable property was governed by the law of England. As a result of this, a half-
blood relative was allowed to inherit, which would not have been the case under Scots law. 
The whole-blood relations appealed the Court of Session’s decision to the House of Lords, 
who quashed the appeal. 
Bruce seems to support the suggestion that the House of Lords, as the common court of 
last instance for both England and Scotland, was instrumental in the development of 
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principled and well-articulated conflict of laws rules in this area. 52 Although the case was 
before the House of Lords, as it was a Scottish appeal, the Scottish practice of citing 
continental jurists seems to have been allowed. Counsel for the appellants, for example, 
acknowledged that the case law in this area was lacking, cited Erskine and Kame in 
support of their appeal and reinforced their argument with reference to Vattell, Voet and 
Villius. Having cited these authors, counsel for the appellant is reported as stating ‘upon 
these principles, the English law is established’. This seems a stark contrast to the English 
case reports previously mentioned, which contain no reference to continental legal 
scholars. What is more, although Bruce was a Scottish appeal, it became ‘naturalized’ as 
part of English law53 and lead to the citation of continental jurists being common place in 
the English courts. 
An example of this is the later English case of Somerville v. Somerville,54 in 1801 by which 
stage the law of the domicile as the law applicable to the succession of moveables seems to 
have been completely resolved. In Somerville, the deceased died intestate with real estate 
in both Scotland and England and personal property in England. It was decided that 
succession to the personal estate of an intestate is regulated by the law of his domicile at 
the time of his death i.e. Scotland. Although counsel for the appellant discussed the case 
law that established the rule that the law of the domicile applies, most of the discussion 
centred on where the appellant’s domicile was rather than which law applied. The 
interesting aspect of the case is the routine manner in which counsel for the appellant cites 
continental jurists (Hubert and Denisart) and even foreign legal cases as authority for the 
application of the law of the domicile. Not only does this case illustrate that citation of 
continental legal writers had become a matter of course in the English courts but it also 
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presents a clear statement by the Master of the Rolls in the Court of Appeal that this was 
perfectly proper and that he would take them into consideration. 
This, therefore, seems to illustrate the positive effect that Scots law had on the evolution of 
English law in this area through the House of Lords as the common court of appeal for 
both jurisdictions.55 As Somerville illustrates, the effect of the House of Lords’ decision in 
Bruce was to introduce the routine citation of foreign legal authorities into the English 
courts and encourage the explicit recognition by the judges that these authorities were at 
least of persuasive value. The harmonising effect of the House of Lords was not, however, 
one sided. As discussed above, the Scottish courts had strayed from their original 
conviction in Brown and were leaning towards the lex situs rather than the lex domicilii as 
governing the succession of moveables. This is clearly illustrated by Lord Thurlow’s 
comments in Bruce: 
In one case it was clearly...decided in the Court of Session, [that the lex 
domicilii applied] and in the other cases which had been relied on as 
favouring the doctrine of lex loci rei sitae,…But to say that the lex loci rei 
sitae is to govern though the domicillium of the deceased be without 
contradiction in a different country, is a gross misapplication of the rules of 
civil law and jus gentium, though the law of Scotland on this point is 
constantly asserted to be founded on them.56 
Therefore, the House of Lords clarified what had until then been a strong, if rather 
unprincipled, conviction, poorly articulated by the lower courts, that the law of the 
domicile applied. It took this countervailing influence of English law, as applied by the 
House of Lords, to set Scots law back on course. 
This sentiment is reflected in Lord Chancellor Loughborough’s judgment in the English 
case of Bempde v. Johnstone in 1796 by which stage the law applicable to the succession 
of moveables was firmly fixed on the law of the domicile: 
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... in the case of a person dying intestate, having property in different places 
and subject to different laws, the law of each place should not obtain in the 
distribution of the property situated there. Many foreign lawyers have held 
that proposition. There was a time, when the Courts of Scotland certainly 
held so. The judgments in the House of Lords have taken a contrary course; 
that there can be but one law: they must fix the place of the domicil; and the 
law of that country, where the domicil is, decides, wherever the property is 
situated. That I take to be fixed law now. The Court of Session has 
conformed to those decisions; according to which the Courts of Great 
Britain, both of Scotland and England, are bound to act. 57 
Based on the foregoing analysis, it seems to be the case that the effect in this area of 
English law on Scots law was to correct the erroneous interpretation of the law that the 
Scottish courts had adopted. The corresponding influence of Scots law on English law was 
to encourage the English courts to adopt a more robust and rigorously reasoned defence of 
the law of the domicile than they had until this point. The importance of this can be seen in 
the case of Hog v Lashley58 in 1792.   
Hog was a Scottish appeal before the House of Lords concerning, amongst other things, the 
reach of Scottish legal rights over moveables situated in England. The facts of the case 
were as follows: Hog was born in Scotland but relocated to London at an early stage, at 
which point he became domiciled in England. Eventually he retired to Scotland, where he 
married and reverted back to his Scottish domicile. After he died leaving moveable 
property in both England and Scotland, one of his daughters, Mrs. Lashley, dissatisfied 
with the provisions that her father had made for her in his will, tried to claim her legal 
rights from both the Scottish and English property. In deciding the case, the House of 
Lords affirmed the interlocutor of the Court of Session that ‘the claim of [legal rights] 
reaches to the English effects as well as the Scotch, notwithstanding the will’. 
In the present writer’s submission, the importance of this case lies in the seemingly 
unhesitating nature with which the court recognised that Scottish legal rights extend to 
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moveables in England. Given how foreign a concept this is to the law of England one 
could imagine that this might have met with some resistance and that the Court would have 
been persuaded by the arguments of counsel for the appellant. This may well have been the 
outcome if all the court had to go on were the bald, unsupported statements of the law in 
the earlier English cases such as Pipon and Thorne. However, the court had before them 
the previous Scottish appeal, decided by the House of Lords, of Bruce, which incorporated 
well-articulated reasoning based on continental legal writings to support the application of 
the law of the domicile. Whilst it is unclear from the case report why the House of Lords 
decided the case the way they did, it seems likely, based on the pleadings of counsel, that 
they would have been influenced by this previous case and continental doctrine. 
Overall, therefore, it is difficult to determine precisely where the English Court’s 
preference for the law of the domicile in private international law of succession derived 
from in the early English cases. However, there is some suggestion that certain judges had 
a degree of awareness of continental legal writings. Indeed this would appear to be the 
source of this rule in Scotland. It is through the House of Lords, as the common court of 
appeal for both England and Scotland, that this rule became entrenched in both 
jurisdictions and that it came to be explicitly supported by arguments based on the works 
of continental jurists. It is this rigorous and well-articulated defence of the law of the 
domicile that has made it a resilient doctrine, which has stood the test of time and allowed 
it to overcome resistance to its application, for example, in extending the recognition of 
legal rights as part of the law of the domicile.  
Therefore, in the early days of the development of private international law in Scotland and 
England, the nascent concept of the law of the domicile governing succession grew and 
became entrenched in the law of these countries as a result of its widespread use and 
defence in continental Europe. Since then the English common-law and the jurisdictions of 
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continental Europe have taken a divergent course. Domicile, as it has developed in English 
case law, has strayed considerably from the original civilian doctrine. At the same time, in 
much of continental Europe, the presence of domicile as a connecting factor has 
diminished considerably and has been replaced by nationality. The following section will 
attempt to chart the rise of nationality on the continent and also discuss the subsequent 
revival of domicile of which the rise of habitual residence as a connecting factor seems to 
be a manifestation. 
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3.3 From Domicile to Habitual Residence via Nationality 
Whereas domicile is the main connecting factor in common-law/Anglo-American 
jurisprudence, nationality is seen as the most prevalent connecting factor in continental 
Europe. As discussed in the previous section, domicile came into the common-law world 
through the influence of continental scholars on the laws of Scotland and England. 
However, shortly after this, domicile became supplanted as the main connecting factor in 
private international law by the new concept of nationality. This shift occurred at the time 
of the adoption of the Napoleonic Code and subsequently gained support in Italy, and 
throughout Europe, through the teachings of Mancini. Despite this, the move from 
domicile to nationality, in France in particular, was not comprehensive and may have even 
been unintentional. As a result domicile remained as a connecting factor alongside 
nationality and enjoyed a subsequent revival in later reform initiatives. This section 
attempts to chart the development from domicile to nationality and explores the revival of 
domicile which resulted in the relatively recent concept of habitual residence. 
As a leading scholar in the field of comparative private international law noted when 
referring to domicile and nationality, ‘the contrast between the two systems of determining 
personal status is deeply rooted in traditions and policies and the near future holds no 
prospects of its elimination.’59 Indeed domicile dates back to ancient Roman law and its 
revival in Europe during Medieval times. As Burge states, ‘in the Middle Ages, during the 
supremacy of the Holy Roman Empire…domicil was the accepted juristic basis of the 
personal law’.60 Given space and time constraints, a detailed discussion of the evolution of 
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the concept of domicile is beyond the scope of this paper.61 However Roman law 
recognised a form of domicile similar to that which exists today: 
Domicillium was held in the place of permanent residence and was where 
the centre of the private life and business activities of the person in question 
was to be found.62 
However, it is unclear what relationship the law of the domicile had with the ius originis 
which some equate with nationality but which the postglossators in the fourteenth century 
treated as a form of domicillium.63 In any event: 
As from the 14th century a pronounced preference for the actual place of 
residence appears to have existed. This view is shared by the French and 
Netherlands’ learned authors of the 16th and 17th century.64 
This persisted into the eighteenth century as is evidenced in several of the civil codes 
found in continental Europe at the time.65 
Although the concept of nationality is not so deeply rooted in history as that of domicile, it 
resulted from the strong revolutionary sentiment of the Napoleonic Civil Code and 
therefore has considerable cultural significance. The French Civil Code does not contain 
many articles relating to private international law. It does, however, contain an early 
embodiment of the nationality principle: 
The laws relating to status and the capacity of persons are binding upon 
French subjects even when residing abroad.66 
This provision was subsequently interpreted by the French courts as meaning that 
foreigners are also governed by their national law.67 Whilst this may seem like a 
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revolutionary change and a break from the past, there is some doubt as to whether the 
drafters of the civil code in fact intended to supplant domicile with nationality. The drafters 
of the civil code may have merged in their minds the concepts of nationality and domicile 
because under the original Napoleonic code a Frenchman who had a settled residence 
abroad without any intention of returning lost his French nationality.68 As one 
commentator, discussing the views of the eminent French scholar Niboyet, notes: 
[T]he authors of the Code civil probably did not mean to break with the 
principle of domicile. They were aware of the distinction between 'le 
domicile et la residence'. Section 3 (3) merely stated that a Frenchman 
should be subject to French law even though he had taken up his residence 
abroad. It was postulated that he had still the intention of returning and thus 
had his domicile in France.69  
The intention of the original drafters notwithstanding, the reference to nationality in the 
French Civil Code had a knock-on effect throughout Europe and played a decisive role in 
establishing nationality as the main connecting factor in private international law. For 
example the fourth paragraph of the Austrian Civil Code, as originally enacted in 1811, 
contained a similar provision,70 as did article 6 of the 1829 Act on Provisions of 
Legislation for the Kingdom of the Netherlands.71  
However, in each of these cases there was some doubt, as was the case with the French 
Civil Code, whether nationality was intended to replace domicile. Savigny, for example, 
was of the opinion that domicile remained the main connecting factor in the Austrian Civil 
Code.72 Despite this, each of these codes came to be interpreted as expressing the principle 
of nationality, thanks in large part to the teachings of the eminent Italian professor 
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Mancini. As one commentator notes when discussing the effect Mancini had on the 
interpretation of the abovementioned Dutch legislation: 
The term “the Dutch” originally was deemed to refer to persons domiciled 
in the Netherlands. During the nineteenth century this definition gradually 
but irresistibly changed in case law, under the influence of Mancini’s 
nationality doctrine to apply to persons having Dutch nationality.73 
Just as the inclusion of nationality in the French Civil Code was a product of the strong 
national sentiment resulting from the French Revolution, so too did the widespread 
acceptance of Mancini’s nationalism result from the unification movement that was 
ongoing in Italy and elsewhere: 
The success of the nationalists is accounted for by various factors…The 
emotional aspects seem, however, to have been decisive. The principle of 
nationality was in keeping with the political movements of a period when 
Italy and Germany accomplished national unification.74 
Therefore, unlike the reception of domicile into English law, which resulted from reasoned 
argumentation, nationality came to supplant domicile in many civil law systems without 
any detailed discussion about their respective pros and cons. Indeed the adoption of 
nationality as a connecting factor resulted from changing political ideology rather than 
well-informed law reform: 
The astounding influence exercised by Mancini’s ideas, in and also outside 
Italy, should, in my opinion, be attributed to the circumstances that his 
creed conformed to the leading political and spiritual trends of the 19th 
century…Mancini’s principle of nationality was a political tenet dressed up 
and displayed as a rule of the law of nations. One can hardly assume that the 
author in shaping his revolutionary ideas ever thought of Private 
International Law.75 
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In spite of its origins, however, the principle of nationality did enter private international 
law and subsequently became deeply entrenched in both domestic and international 
conflict of laws rules. 
As Burge notes,76 this change is present in many of the civil codes that were subsequently 
adopted such as the Italian Civil Code of 1865 and the German Civil Code of 1900. In 
terms of national private international law, ‘the nationality principle was embodied in the 
codes of many countries including Romania, Portugal, Germany, Spain, Turkey, Poland, 
Finland…the Netherlands and Belgium.’77 In this way, domicile, the predominant 
connecting factor for the designation of personal law in Europe since the time of the 
Roman Empire, had been replaced with the more political concept of nationality in the 
domestic laws of much of continental Europe. 
Beyond this, however, nationality played a decisive role in early international conventions 
relating to private international law especially those concluded under the auspices of the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law. The four early conventions that relate to 
family law, concluded shortly after the Hague Conference was established, all refer to 
nationality.78 These are namely the conventions on marriage,79 divorce,80 guardianship81 
and effects of marriage.82 These conventions ensured that nationality as a connecting factor 
gained a prominent place in multilateral and domestic private international law rules. 
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Despite the rise in prominence of the nationality principle, it never quite managed to 
extinguish domicile as a connecting factor, particularly not in the field of succession. 
Domicile, for example, was retained as the main connecting factor in relation to succession 
in the Napoleonic code.  This is due to the fact that apart from a limited number of 
provisions in the Civil Code, the majority of private international law remained uncodified. 
As one commentator observes: 
Because of the limited scope of the French codification in this field…most 
of the rules have been inherited from the pre-Code law. Since nationality as 
a factor of determination was a concept foreign to the French scholars of the 
eighteenth century, it follows that in those uncodified branches of conflict 
of laws, such as successions, donations and contracts, factors other than 
nationality are ordinarily decisive.83 
This would seem to be in line with the suggestion made earlier that reference to nationality 
in the French civil code was not an attempt to systematically replace domicile with 
nationality as a connecting factor in private international law. The retention of domicile in 
the private international law of succession was, until recently, also echoed in Belgium84. 
However a number of other countries have replaced domicile with nationality even as 
regards private international law of succession e.g. Germany85 and Italy.86  
Regardless of the degree to which nationality penetrated the private international law rules 
of individual countries, a general resurgence in the popularity of domicile occurred largely 
as a result of later Hague Conventions. In the 1925 and 1928 discussions on the draft 
Succession Convention, there was clear division over whether domicile or nationality 
should be used as the connecting factor, both for the designation of applicable law and for 
conferring jurisdiction. This resulted in a compromise that referred to both domicile and 
nationality. However this proved to be unworkable and was not ratified.87 At about this 
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time, the use of nationality as a connecting factor in transnational private international law 
instruments began to decline. This was as a result of the criticism that nationality in private 
international law attracted from various quarters after the First and Second World Wars. 
Whilst a detailed discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of nationality is beyond the 
scope of this thesis,88 it became clear that stateless people and people with dual nationality 
presented significant problems that necessitated the use of domicile as an additional 
connecting factor. 
The various problems presented by the use of nationality in private international law 
prompted the suggestion that domicile should be revived as a connecting factor, at the 
national as well as international level: 
During the past few decades a body of opinion favouring a return to the 
principle of domicile can be observed…A number of authoritative jurists in 
France expressed a distinct preference for subjecting personal status to the 
law of the domicile.89 
Early attempts at codification of French private international law attempted to address the 
problems associated with nationality by reviving domicile as a connecting factor: 
In supporting a draft decree-law proposed by Prof. Niboyet in 1939…which 
would have amended article 3 (3) of the Civil Code to make the law of the 
domicile, rather than the national law, the law governing status and capacity 
of persons, the Executive Council of the Société de Législation Comparée 
pointed to the presence in France at that time of more than two million 
resident aliens.90 
Unfortunately, these draft codifications were not successful despite subsequent alterations 
limiting reference to domicile. It would appear that the lack of success with which these 
initiatives met had less to do with opposition to the inclusion of domicile as it did with the 
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fact that they probably would not have greatly contributed to strengthening the coherence 
of French private international law rules.91 
The resurgence of domicile as a connecting factor is particularly evident in the law of 
succession: 
Meijers, the champion of the nationality principle, in a well-known paper 
even in 1936 advocated the application of the domicile of the deceased to 
the administration, settlement and distribution of the estate, on the grounds 
that the nationality of the deceased is not relevant to these matters…92   
Indeed, this is the position that has persisted in France throughout the rise of nationality as 
a connecting factor in other areas of private international law. Given the political 
entrenchment of nationality as a connecting factor and the fact that systematic attempts to 
revive domicile had failed, national courts sought a more practical solution. In the 
Netherlands, for example, prior to 1996, the law of the nationality applied to succession.93 
Despite this, ‘[c]ourts often made exceptions to this rule…This happened when a real 
connection with the national country was lacking’.94 This resulted in the law of the 
domicile or last residence being applied.95 Since 1996, the Dutch private international law 
rules of succession have been reformed to be more in line with these court decisions. This 
was affected through the wholesale adoption of the 1986 Hague Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Succession of the Estate of Deceased Persons, which has resulted in an 
increased emphasis on habitual residence rather than nationality, although the latter still 
plays a reduced role.96 The Dutch legislature’s decision to make the transition from 
nationality to habitual residence rather than adopt the French rule of domicile is indicative 
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of the decline of nationality in favour of a residence-based connecting factor but also 
highlights the problems associated with the concept of domicile.   
A comprehensive discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of domicile as a connecting 
factor is beyond the scope of this thesis.97 However some appreciation of the attraction and 
difficulties associated with domicile in private international law is necessary in order to 
understand the shift from nationality to habitual residence in Europe. Nationality was 
increasingly criticised as not providing a meaningful connection in private international 
law because of its inflexibility. There was no scope for people to change their personal law 
by leaving their country of origin and making a life elsewhere. This seems particularly 
lamentable in light of the free movement of persons within the EU. In addition, nationality 
became an increasingly untenable connecting factor, as it did not address the problem of 
the large number of stateless people following the Second World War.  Domicile, on the 
other hand, was seen as reflecting an implicit choice that a person has made by settling 
down in a different country.98 In addition, in theory, a person’s domicile should be where 
they are most culturally and socially integrated and where they feel most part of a 
community. 
However, despite these advantages, one of the main obstacles to applying the law of the 
domicile is the widely differing conceptions of what domicile actually is. This can be seen 
most markedly when comparing the concept of domicile in the UK with that of continental 
Europe. Without entering into a detailed discussion about the respective definitions of 
domicile, there is a gulf between how domicile has come to be used in the United Kingdom 
and how it is understood in France, for example. Both under Roman and French law, 
domicile is seen as reflecting the centre of a person’s affairs.99 Whilst this is also the case 
in the United Kingdom, the possibility that the domicile of origin can revive to prevent a 
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person from being without a domicile at any point can artificially skew this notion. This 
makes the use of domicile in the United Kingdom more akin to the continental European 
concept of nationality because it is more concerned that there is always a law that 
determines a person’s civil status rather than where the centre of a person’s affairs is.100    
Many of the criticisms relating to nationality on the continent can be levelled against the 
definition of domicile in the UK, not least of which is that it is out of step with reality: 
In the particular and fundamentally important matter of domicile the law 
has considerably developed during the last fifty years, but it may be doubted 
whether the development has been wise and whether even now matters are 
not being made worse. Only too often does it happen that the legal domicile 
bears a very remote relation to what in fact is the permanent home of the de 
cujus.101  
Therefore, as a result of the manifest failings of nationality as a connecting factor, there 
was a growing movement towards the use of a more residence-based connecting factor 
such as (the continental European version of) domicile. However, the often absurd 
outcomes that resulted from the English conception of domicile prevented widespread 
support for its revival.102 Instead, the new connecting factor of habitual residence was 
adopted. 
The concept of habitual residence seems to have entered European private international 
law through the early work of the Hague Conference on Private International Law. It is 
difficult to chart precisely the evolution of habitual residence within the Conference given 
the lack of record of these early sessions in the English language. However, it is possible to 
describe briefly how habitual residence came to be used as the main connecting factor in 
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European private international law through the accounts of various delegates to the Hague 
Conference. 
The concept, seemingly derived from German law, was chosen over domicile because it 
was more factually based and less technical.103 It seems to have first appeared in the 
Convention on Guardianship of 1902104 and the Interdiction convention of 1905.105 
However, it was not until the post-war conventions such as the 1956 Child Maintenance 
Convention,106 that habitual residence became firmly established as a principal connecting 
factor in its own right.107 In the years immediately following this, habitual residence 
featured in an increasing number of conventions108 and has now become an accepted part 
of Hague Conventions and EU Regulations dealing with private international law. 
Habitual residence was seen as being the true essence of domicile without any of the 
complications resulting from a legalistic interpretation: 
Either the habitual residence coincides with the domicile, and in that event 
identification is warranted and justified or they do not coincide, and then we 
must admit that the domicile becomes a less adequate element, which – so 
to say – has something fictitious in it.109 
The suggestion that habitual residence is, in fact, the true manifestation of domicile is 
supported by the discussions leading up to the draft Convention to determine conflicts 
between national law and the law of domicile. The drafting committee’s recommendation 
that domicile for the purposes of that convention should be construed as habitual residence 
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was subsequently adopted.110 In addition to this, the 1955 Convention Relating to the 
Settlement of the Conflicts between the Law of Nationality and the Law of Domicile 
defined domicile as the place where a person habitually resides.111 
Therefore, despite this early use of nationality as the principal connecting factor, the post-
war conventions utilise the concept of habitual residence rather than nationality.112 This 
represents a further shift in the connecting factor of choice for much of continental Europe. 
As one commentator puts it, ‘“habitual residence” is a term, generally unknown to the 
common law, which is much in vogue on the Continent’.113 Nowadays, habitual residence 
is as dominant and prevalent a connecting factor in continental Europe as nationality ever 
was: 
This comparatively new phrase is much in use not only in domestic 
legislation but also in various Hague Conventions on the reform of private 
international law and it is in widespread use by the European 
Commission.114      
Therefore, whilst the common law retained domicile, which it inherited from the civil law, 
as its main connecting factor, the civilian legal systems of continental Europe abandoned 
this, at first for nationality and later for habitual residence, which remains dominant in 
Europe today. 
The Hague Conference has, throughout, resisted calls115 to define habitual residence given 
that it is to be determined on the facts of a case, preferring, instead, that the concept retain 
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its inherent flexibility. Some have suggested that a minimum period of residence is 
required in order to establish a habitual residence: 
Habitual residences always vouch for a certain measure of duration, of 
continuity of the legal situation of the individual concerned.116 
Despite this, any attempt to set a definitive minimum period of residence would remove 
the factual element of habitual residence and convert it into an inflexible legal doctrine 
similar to domicile, thus losing one of the advantages of using habitual residence as a 
connecting factor.  
The 1989 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estate of 
Deceased Persons117 tried to strike some sort of balance between a durable connecting 
factor such as nationality and the more changeable habitual residence by allowing habitual 
residence to operate in a limited number of circumstances. These are, namely, when 
habitual residence and nationality coincide or where the deceased had been resident in that 
state for at least five years prior to death, provided that there is not a manifestly closer 
connection with their national law. In all other circumstances national law applies unless 
there is a manifestly closer connection with another state, in which case the law of that 
state applies. This definition would seem to address the concerns of those who call for a 
minimum residence requirement as part of the definition of habitual residence. In the 
present writer’s submission, however, these rules create an overly complex and uncertain 
system that undermines the very flexibility and fact-centred focus of habitual residence that 
gave it the advantage over both domicile and nationality. Perhaps, rather than a minimum 
period of residence, it would be sufficient to suggest that a degree of social integration or 
durable connection is required. The following section will discuss how such a solution has 
been reached in Belgium’s domestic private international law. 
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3.4 Habitual Residence: In Search of a Definition 
Habitual residence as a connecting factor in private international law can be found in EU 
legislation dealing with a variety of different areas. The concept is usually left loosely 
defined and there tends to be very little guidance as to the degree of actual residence 
required to constitute habitual residence. Whilst a detailed discussion of the definition of 
habitual residence is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is necessary to give an outline of the 
current approach in order to appreciate some of the concerns discussed below. 
Habitual residence is a familiar concept in both continental Europe and the United 
Kingdom. As regards the latter, habitual residence has appeared in a number of UK statutes 
and its interpretation has resulted in a large body of case law.118 Despite this, the European 
Court of Justice made it clear in Swaddling119 that habitual residence, as used in EU 
regulations, bears an autonomous meaning. This conclusion is supported by the subsequent 
English High Court decision in Marinos v. Marinos.120  
The ECJ gave some guidance as to the definition of habitual residence in the Swaddling 
Case,121 which was concerned with EU social security legislation. In that case, the ECJ 
held that ‘the length of residence in the Member State…cannot be regarded as an intrinsic 
element of the concept of [habitual] residence’.122 Therefore, an extended period of actual 
residence is not required for a person to acquire an habitual residence. As Lamont notes, 
‘The definition of habitual residence in Swaddling is suitable for the EC Social security 
                                                 
118
 For a detailed discussion of case law see J Fawcett, P North and J Carruthers (eds), Cheshire, North & 
Fawcett: Private International Law (14th edn, OUP, Oxford 2008) 182-196 and E Clive, ‘The Concept of 
Habitual Residence’ [1997] Juridical Review 137. 
119
 Case C-90/97 Swaddling v. Adjudication Officer [1999] ECR I-1075. 
120
 [2007] EWHC 2047 (Fam). 
121
 Swaddling (n 119) 
122
 Swaddling (n 119) [30]. 
112 
 
context in which it was developed…but it is odd to call residence “habitual” immediately, 
or very shortly after, arrival’.123 
Although in Swaddling the ECJ laid down a community-wide definition of habitual 
residence it is one that is limited to its specific legislative context.124 A more recent ECJ 
decision in the case of A125 concerning jurisdiction in relation to parental responsibility 
under Brussels II bis,126 reaffirms that an autonomous EU definition of habitual residence 
must be used and that a definition that works in one area of law cannot necessarily be 
transposed into another. Despite this, the ECJ makes clear that, at least in the context of 
parental responsibility, habitual residence: 
Must be interpreted as meaning that it corresponds to the place which 
reflects some degree of integration by the child in a social and family 
environment. To that end, in particular the duration, regularity, conditions 
and reasons for the stay on the territory of a Member State and the family’s 
move to that State, the child’s nationality, the place and conditions of 
attendance at school, linguistic knowledge and the family and social 
relationships of the child in that State must be taken into consideration. It is 
for the national court to establish the habitual residence of the child, taking 
account of all the circumstances specific to each individual case.127 
Given the diversity of topics which involve some use of habitual residence in EU law, it 
would be extremely difficult to lay down one uniform definition applicable to every 
context. Indeed, it may be advantageous to have different definitions for each context in 
which habitual residence is encountered. It may also be advantageous, in certain contexts, 
for habitual residence to be loosely defined. In legislation concerning child 
custody/abduction the sensitive and complex nature of these cases may warrant a fluid 
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definition. However, as Professor Matthews highlights in his oral evidence to the House of 
Lords EU Select Committee:  
the whole thrust of the use of “habitual residence” in this draft regulation to 
choose an applicable law is completely different from the context in which 
you see it elsewhere. So my view would be that unless you can get some 
kind of definition of what you mean, this is a recipe for litigation and 
uncertainty until the litigation is resolved by the European Court of 
Justice.128 
Therefore, rather than promoting legal certainty, as the Regulation aims to do, it might be 
jeopardising it.  
This lack of a precise definition of habitual residence, whilst tolerable and even desirable 
in other areas, seems to be a major obstacle to the UK’s participation in the regulation. As 
Oliver Parker, speaking on behalf of the UK Government, highlights in his evidence to the 
House of Lords EU select committee: 
The primary reason for the Government’s concern that the regulation uses 
the undefined connecting factor of habitual residence is that the deployment 
of such a concept on its own would be liable to subject the estates of 
individuals, either on short-term employment secondments overseas or 
otherwise without an adequately substantial connection to a particular legal 
system to that system’s law of succession.129 
If this were to be the effect of the regulation, it would not only frustrate legal certainty, but 
it would also offend against the principle of legitimate expectations. It seems, from Mr 
Parker’s evidence,130 that the UK Government has given some consideration to various 
solutions to this problem including defining the concept of habitual residence and a Hague-
like solution131 of combining an undefined habitual residence with a minimum factual 
residence requirement. Whilst the House of Lords has made it clear that in the English 
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conception of habitual residence there must be an appreciable period of actual residence,132 
the English courts have shown a reluctance to set down a minimum period of residence.133 
A further mechanism to alleviate the unintended consequences of a changing habitual 
residence could be a more extensive ability for parties to designate the applicable law. This 
issue warrants detailed discussion. However due to space and time constraints the 
treatment of the topic in this paper will be somewhat cursory.134 The regulation only allows 
a very limited freedom to choose the applicable law and makes no provision for 
prorogation of jurisdiction. This is lamentable given party autonomy’s potential to remedy 
perceived defects in the regulations. As the European Parliament highlights: 
It would be appropriate to allow the testator to choose which body of law 
should govern the succession, the law of the country of which he is a 
national or the law of his habitual residence at the time the choice is 
made.135  
 
This suggestion is far from unrestricted freedom to designate the applicable law. This 
would be undesirable because it could result in the applicability of laws which have no 
connection to the deceased. It may, however, not go far enough. It seems desirable that 
parties are allowed to also designate prior habitual residences provided they have some 
substantial connection to that country. This is the approach favoured by the UK 
government. However, a number of Member States are concerned that this would lead to 
evasion of their system of legal rights. As a result, the Commission chose to adopt an even 
more restrictive freedom of choice, limiting it to the country of nationality. This seems to 
be a missed opportunity on their part. Party autonomy could be used as an additional 
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connecting factor to mitigate the shortcomings of using the deceased’s last habitual 
residence in the succession context.  
Whilst an increased focus on party autonomy could mitigate the harshness of the 
unintended consequences associated with a changeable connecting factor like habitual 
residence, it would only be effective where people actually make a choice. Therefore, it 
does not remove the need to find a suitable definition for habitual residence. Given that a 
prescribed minimum period of residence may lead to a certain undesirable inflexibility, the 
solution adopted in Belgium as a result of recent reform may be preferable.   
According to Belgium’s 2004 Code of Private International Law, the Belgian courts have 
general jurisdiction to hear cases ‘if the defendant has his domicile or habitual residence in 
Belgium when the action is introduced’.136 In the case of succession, however, the Belgian 
courts have jurisdiction if ‘the deceased had his habitual residence in Belgium at the time 
of his death or the claim relates to assets that are located in Belgium when the action is 
introduced’.137 Therefore, the general grounds of jurisdiction have been modified to the 
extent that domicile has been removed as a connecting factor for succession and the 
location of the assets has been inserted.  
This is a modification of the pre-2004 situation, which is outlined in the Belgian national 
report contained in the previous (2004) edition of Garb’s International Succession. The 
report states that, ‘[i]n terms of Article 635, 4 of the Judicial Code (hereafter BJC) a 
Belgian court would...have jurisdiction...if the proceedings were commenced in 
Belgium’.138 As the Belgian National Report annexed to the German Notary Institute’s 
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2002 study139 states, this has to be interpreted in light of article 110 of the Belgian Civil 
Code, according to which ‘a succession falls open in Belgium if the deceased has his last 
domicile in Belgium’.140 The report goes on to explain that by virtue of articles 624 (1) and 
635 (2) and (10) of the Belgian Judicial Code, the Belgian courts may exercise jurisdiction 
if one of the heirs is domiciled in Belgium and by virtue of 625 (1) they may exercise 
jurisdiction over immovable assets situated in Belgium. Furthermore, article 15 of the 
Belgian Civil Code provides a broad ground of jurisdiction based on Belgian citizenship. 
As the report highlights, ‘[t]his article can justify competence for a Belgian court to judge 
liquidation and distribution of movables of a succession fallen open abroad’.141 
Therefore, whilst assets being located in Belgium remains a connecting factor conferring 
jurisdiction on Belgian courts over those assets, they no longer exercise jurisdiction as 
regards succession on the basis of domicile but rather habitual residence. These specific 
connecting factors also seem to have the effect of excluding the more general jurisdictional 
basis of Belgian citizenship contained in the Belgian civil code. As one commentator 
notes:   
The Code...constitutes a watershed in the development of Belgian law. The 
general Belgian principle of law that allowed a claimant to bring a civil or 
commercial matter before a Belgian court, based solely on the fact that the 
claimant was a Belgian national, now appears to be well and truly 
defunct.142    
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As regards applicable law, the law that governs succession has similarly changed from that 
of the last domicile of the deceased143 to that of the deceased’s habitual residence at the 
time of death.144 However, the code does confirm that the lex rei situs will continue to 
govern the succession of immoveable property.145 It is noteworthy that, despite the fact that 
the code does not allow the general application of renvoi,146 it will accept renvoi as regards 
immovable property where the conflict rules of the lex situs designate the law of the 
habitual residence as the applicable law.147  
This recent codification, whilst illustrating the move from domicile and nationality to 
habitual residence in Belgian private international law relating to succession, also provides 
an opportunity to examine the definition of these connecting factors. Initially, Belgian law 
seemed to define domicile in similar terms as the common law: 
The domicile is, according to Article 102 BCC, the place where the person 
has at the same time, situated his residence, the centre of his affairs, the seat 
of his wealth and the affection of his family. It is not necessarily the place 
where the deceased lived at the time of death. 148  
This is seen as an explicit rejection of a more formalistic conception of domicile: 
The concept of domicile must be determined according to the lex fori. In 
this context reference is not made to article 36 Judicial Code (place of 
registration in the population register) but to article 102 Civil Code defining 
the domicile as the principal establishment. This obviously is a question of 
fact.149  
However, this position has been completely reversed in the recent code which provides that 
domicile means ‘the place where a natural person has his main residence according to the 
civil register of the population, the register of foreigners or the “waiting register”’.150 In the 
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present writer’s submission, this renders domicile a question of status, which can be 
resolved on the basis of official documentation, in a similar way to nationality. This stands 
in stark contrast to the original definition of domicile which turned on the particular facts 
and circumstances of the case. However, it seems that the Belgian legislature has defined 
habitual residence in such a way that it closely resembles the former definition of domicile: 
For the purpose of the present statute, habitual residence means...the place 
where a natural person has established his main residence, even in the 
absence of registration and independent of a residence or establishment 
permit; in order to determine this place, the circumstances of personal or 
professional nature that show durable connections with that place or 
indicate the will to create such connections are taken into account.151  
Indeed, this detailed description of what constitutes habitual residence seems more akin to 
the common-law concept of domicile because it not only contains the notion of a lasting 
connection but it also includes an element of intent which would be lacking from bare 
residence. Therefore, under this definition, it seems that habitual residence can be acquired 
through something more than mere transitory residence and would be greatly facilitated by 
some evidence of an intention to make the place of residence a long-term centre of affairs. 
Such a conception of habitual residence would seem instinctively more palatable to 
common-law lawyers than a completely undefined and vague notion of habitual residence. 
Although this definition does not contain any kind of minimum residence requirements, it 
does indicate that a lasting, rather than fleeting, connection with the place of residence is 
required. 
The conception of habitual residence contained in the Belgian Code of Private 
International Law gives some indication of what factors are to be considered when 
determining habitual residence. This stands in contrast to the proposed Regulation’s 
complete lack of definition of habitual residence. Despite this, the Belgian code provides 
little guidance on how much weight should be given to duration and intent or what is 
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sufficient to establish a lasting connection in the succession context. These are questions 
that will ultimately be decided by the ECJ and a detailed discussion of the various possible 
factors are beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it seems that the proposed Regulation 
could be guided by the Belgian code, at least to indicate that a durable connection and 
intent is required and perhaps even to go further to list certain factors that might be taken 
into account (e.g. actual residence of a certain length, location of assets etc).    
In the present writer’s submission, such a definition would be commensurate with the 
factual nature of habitual residence. By highlighting the factors to be taken into account, 
the regulation would be providing a level of guidance that means people can reasonably 
expect to be able to determine their habitual residence. It seems unnecessary to go further 
than this and prescribe a minimum period of residence, which is one of the options the UK 
is considering.152 This might undermine the discretionary and fact-based nature of habitual 
residence by preventing people who have a genuine, durable connection to a State from 
acquiring a habitual residence there merely because they do not meet the actual residency 
requirements.   
One of the main concerns that the UK sees a minimum period of actual residence 
addressing is the risk that temporary workers abroad would unwittingly acquire a new 
habitual residence during their secondment. This problem, at least for foreign diplomats, 
was identified and addressed in Belgium under the old concept of domicile: 
A special problem arises for diplomats and officials of various international 
organisations working in Belgium. Unless they have the Belgian nationality, 
diplomats will be considered to have maintained their domicile abroad, 
insofar as they were not domiciled in Belgium before they were posted to 
Belgium. Members of permanent delegations with the Council of NATO 
and with the EU, as well as certain high officials in NATO, the Belgian-
Luxembourg Economic Union, the OECD, and the International Cotton 
Institute have diplomatic status as well. Members of foreign consulates, 
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have a similar status insofar as they do not pursue any commercial activities 
in Belgium.153 
Therefore, perhaps a compromise solution, similar to that found in the Belgian Code of 
Private International Law, namely a list of factors to be taken into account in determining 
habitual residence combined with a specific exception for workers seconded abroad, 
especially for a finite period, could be adopted in the Succession Regulation. This would 
avoid the need to stipulate minimum actual residence requirements which could result in 
inflexibility and harsh results. It could be called the Belgian Compromise (!) 
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3.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has been an attempt to highlight certain concerns with the proposed 
Regulation’s use of habitual residence as the main connecting factor. It has tried to set the 
discussion surrounding the most appropriate connecting factor in a historical context. By 
charting the reception of domicile into the law of Great Britain and its abandonment in the 
civil law, the irony of Member States’ current positions regarding domicile and habitual 
residence can be seen. The English common law initially used residence as determining 
personal law but due to the influence of the civil law, latterly changed to domicile; by 
contrast, the civil law countries started with domicile but now favour habitual residence via 
a long utilisation of nationality. 
Domicile and habitual residence represent the two ends of the spectrum; the former 
represents a durable connection that changes infrequently, whereas the latter is a more 
changeable and transient connecting factor.  A person can travel abroad extensively, living 
in several different Member States, and never change their domicile, provided they always 
retain the intention of returning home. Such a person’s habitual residence, however, is 
likely to change rather frequently. Neither the traditional concept of domicile, as it 
currently stands in the common law, nor a completely undefined habitual residence, is 
likely to prove acceptable to all states. However, given the opposition by many continental 
European Member States and the effect it may have to the concept in other areas, a strict 
definition of habitual residence may be difficult to negotiate. Therefore, in order to secure 
a workable compromise solution it may be necessary to think more creatively and rely 
more on other devices such as requiring a significant connection to the Member State and a 
more flexible approach to party autonomy. 
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Conclusion 
The law of succession is not widely viewed as an area of law that is particularly suitable 
for harmonisation due to its inherent cultural component:  
Succession law is traditionally conceived to be more deeply rooted in the 
legal culture of a country than other areas of law... interrelation between the 
culture of a country and its succession law cannot be denied.1  
Despite this, resistance to the harmonisation of succession law does not always go 
unchallenged:  
The social problem to be solved by the law of succession .. .is of a morally 
and culturally more delicate nature than contract law. Perhaps even more 
than family law, the law of succession is a field reserved to local rules and 
customs, a field in which the desire or need for unification seems to be, at 
best, moderate ...Because of its deep roots in the fundamental social and 
cultural values of a society, it is argued that family and succession law 
should remain national (or regional in a federal system) legal matters. 
However, this traditional view should be reconsidered.2  
This thesis is, however, not concerned with the harmonisation of substantive succession 
law, which is not within the competence of the European Union. Instead, the foregoing 
chapters have discussed the proposed Succession Regulation, which attempts to harmonise 
private international law matters relating to succession.  
In this regard, the above considerations are, nevertheless, relevant because a lack of basic 
agreement about what constitutes the underlying substantive law of succession can present 
problems to attempts to harmonise conflict of laws rules. As the previous chapters have 
attempted to illustrate, there are some considerable differences in the substantive 
succession laws of the Member States and these ‘existing differences of the succession 
laws are to some extent caused by different culturally formed perceptions of the political 
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actors.’3 The main argument of this thesis is that a greater awareness of the historical 
evolution in the various legal systems of these problematic aspects of succession law and 
private international law will help increase understanding of the reasons why these 
differences exist and how they might be overcome. This in turn could lead to more flexible 
negotiating positions as Member States realise that the reasons why these areas became so 
culturally rooted may no longer be as relevant today.  
An important illustration of this is the issue of claw-back. Chapter two showed that family 
restrictions on the alienation of property can be traced back to French customary law and 
that of the Germanic tribes that overran the Roman empire. Moreover, these customs 
existed in Britain as well as in France and Germany. In Britain, however, they died out 
thanks to the freedom of alienation of land that resulted from the rise of commerce and the 
decline of feudalism and came to be protected by the common law courts. By contrast, in 
France, as a result of the co-existence of written and customary law, claw-back became 
entrenched alongside the protection of legal rights during the reception and revival of 
Roman law.  
Another salient issue that was explored in chapter three was the choice of an appropriate 
connecting factor in private international law of succession. An analysis of early cases and 
legal writing reveal that domicile was adopted in Scotland and England as the principal 
connecting factor to determine which law governed the succession of moveables before it 
was being replaced by nationality in much of the rest of Europe. However, unlike the rise 
of nationality on the continent, which was more a result of political ideology than well 
thought out law reform, the use of domicile became entrenched in the UK as a result of 
well-reasoned argumentation based on continental legal writings.  
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This historical approach to some of the issues raised by the regulation enhances our 
understanding of the evolution of some of the most culturally entrenched elements of 
succession. It can lead to the conclusion, as with the issue of claw-back, that countries can 
take divergent paths on ideas they once held in common for no particular reason other than 
the different evolution of law in these respective countries. It can also indicate, as with the 
issue of the appropriate connecting factor, that the evolution of law can be heavily 
influenced by unrelated political and cultural factors. The realisation that results from this 
historical analysis is that, even in an area as culturally rooted as succession, the common 
law and civil law have similar origins but grew apart over time because of circumstances 
rather than as a result of conscious law reform in response to systemic differences.  
Whilst this may be comforting to the extent that it suggests that the obstacles presented by 
the regulation are not insurmountable, it is of limited use in suggesting potential solutions. 
Therefore, throughout, this thesis has adopted a comparative law approach in addition to its 
historical analysis. Through this, potential solutions have emerged to some of the key 
issues that have been highlighted. One example of this is in the designation of the most 
appropriate connecting factor.  
Despite a revival of the idea of a connecting factor based on residence on the continent, the 
common-law notion of domicile, skewed from its original meaning as it has become, 
seems rather undesirable. As a result, habitual residence has emerged as the most likely 
connecting factor. Whilst this modern concept is more reflective of reality than nationality 
and lacks the legalistic complications associated with domicile, it is not without its 
problems. It currently lacks any firm, European definition and as a result creates a great 
deal of uncertainty, which could lead to undesirable and unintended changes in people's 
legal position as they move between Member States. 
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Ultimately the definition of habitual residence in the Regulation will depend on the 
European Court of Justice's interpretation. Despite this, there have been calls for the 
inclusion of a minimum period of residence in order to create a more closely defined 
concept. This runs the risk of transforming habitual residence into a legalistic concept like 
domicile with all the drawbacks this entails. Perhaps a more acceptable solution, which 
results from a comparative analysis in chapter three of how habitual residence operates 
both domestically and internationally, is an explicit statement in the definition of habitual 
residence that a durable connection is required without having to stipulate a minimum 
period, similar to the situation in Belgium. This would effectively be a codification of the 
ECJ's case law in other areas but it would serve to highlight the particular significance in 
the area of succession that there must be a substantial connection to the Member State.  
Another area where a comparative law analysis proved useful is on the issue of claw-back. 
One solution that was suggested to overcome the problem of claw-back is to subject the 
inter vivos transfer of gifts to the putative applicable law at the time of making the gift. 
Whilst this solution, adopted by Swedish law,4 does not go as far as the UK would like, it 
does represent a credible compromise solution. Whether this solution will be adopted 
depends on whether it is suggested and accepted by Member States during the ongoing 
negotiations.  
Despite the utility of this thesis's historical and comparative law approach, it is difficult to 
gauge the political feasibility of the potential solutions this has produced. Their 
practicability largely depends on what compromises can be reached during negotiations. 
Therefore, this thesis has, in no way, attempted to suggest what form the final regulation 
should take, even as regards the limited number of issues that have been covered, as it 
would be futile to second-guess political negotiations on such a moving target as the 
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proposed Regulation. Instead, this thesis has been an attempt to situate current divergences 
and differences in their historical context and to flag up potential solutions to these 
problems that a comparative law analysis reveals.  
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